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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103O). 
Jurisdiction prior to transfer from the Supreme Court was proper pursuant to Utah 
~ Code § 78A-3-102O). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Skip Wing sued Cathy Code under a For Sale By Owner 
commission contract that contained a prevailing party attorney fee provision. At 
trial, Ms. Code was granted a directed verdict on Mr. Wing's claim. Did the trial 
court err in awarding Ms. Code attorney fees against Mr. Wing? 
Preservation: Mr. Wing did not preserve the issue presented in his 
appellate brief, and in fact invited the alleged error. See pp. 25-27, infra. 
Standards of Review: 
Denial of a Rule 59 motion to amend or alter a judgment is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2013 UT App 84, ,r 12, 301 P.3d 6. 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Outsource Receivables Management, Inc. v. Bishop, 2015 UT App 41, 344 P.3d 
1167. 
Interpretation of a contract is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Shiozawa v. Duke, 2015 UT App 40, if 24,344 P.3d 1174. 
I 
A trial court's interpretation of the course of proceedings before it, including 
the scope of a party's pleadings, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Q 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963); 5 Charles A. Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1217 (3d ed. 2002) g 
(court's assessment of scope of pleadings under Rule 8(a) "is largely a matter that is 
left for the discretion of the trial court, which will be reversed by the court of appeals 
only if that discretion is abused"). Factual determinations are reviewed for clear 
error. Widdison v. Widdison, 2014 UT App 233, ~ 17,336 P.3d 1106. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code § 78B-5-826: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails 
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or 
other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of 
the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least 
one party to recover attorney fees. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Skip Wing sued several defendants for a commission based upon 
a For Sale By Owner agreement. At trial, Mr. Wing prevailed against a co-
defendant, Charles Schvaneveldt, but his claims against appellee Cathy Code were 
dismissed on directed verdict. 
Mr. Wing sought, and was awarded, attorney fees against Mr. Schvaneveldt 
under a "prevailing party" fee provision of the FSBO. In so doing, Mr. Wing and 
2 
G 
his counsel argued repeatedly that Mr. Wing was a prevailing party in the case, that 
he had sued to enforce the FSBO, that he was a client and plaintiff distinct from the 
other plaintiffs, that he had a personal stake in the case, and that he was entitled to 
~ an award of fees under the FSBO. Ms. Code sought, and was awarded, attorney 
fees against Mr. Wing under the same prevailing party provision of the FSBO. 
Later, in connection with post-judgment motions filed by other defendants 
regarding standing, a ruling was issued limiting Mr. Wing's status as a creditor of 
defendant Schvaneveldt to that of a representative capacity. Mr. Wing relies 
heavily on that ruling on appeal, but fails to mention that the trial court declined to 
modify his status with respect to Ms. Code's judgment, observing that Mr. Wing 
had not raised the issue with the court. Mr. Wing's brief also fails to address 
alternative bases for the trial court's ruling finding him personally liable for 
-~ attorney fees, or to show how the ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. For any 
or all of these reasons, the judgment in favor of Ms. Code should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
The complicated and extensive procedural history of this case is set forth in 
detail in the brief of appellant Charles Schvaneveldt in a related appeal, Case No. 
20130746-CA, pp. 3-30. Specific to this appeal, appellant Hilary "Skip" Wing and 
. 
other plaintiffs sued appellee Cathy Code, seeking a $130,000 commission under a 
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For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement ("FSBO"). (R. 3491.) Ms. Code's 
motion for summary judgment was denied, and the claims went to trial. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case in chief, the trial court granted Ms. 
Code's motion for directed verdict and dismissed the claims against her. (R. 5423.) Q 
Mr. Wing and the other plaintiffs prevailed against a co-defendant, Charles 
Schvaneveldt, who had not signed but had allegedly ratified the FSBO. (R. 5388.) 
Mr. Wing and the other plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees against Mr. 
Schvaneveldt, citing a "prevailing party" fee provision in the FSBO. (R. 5677, 
5679.) Ms. Code then filed a motion for attorney fees against Mr. Wing and the 
other plaintiffs under the same provision. (R. 5977.) In addressing the parties' 
motions, the trial court summarized certain procedural history pertinent to its ruling. 
The following are excerpts (verbatim) from the trial court's statement ofhistory1: 
C, 
w 
This case started on November 1 7, 2006, when Petitioner ReMax Elite ~ 
("ReMax"), through its attorney Timothy Stewart of the firm Smart, Schofield, 
Shorter & Lunceford filed a Petition ("Original petition") naming Still 
Standing Stables L.C. ("Seller" or "SSS") and Emmett Warren/Assign WBL 
Development LLC ("Buyer") as Respondents. The Original Petition sought 
declaratory relief regarding a contract dispute between Buyer and Seller in 
1 Some paragraphs dealing with matters not pertinent to the appeal, such as the 
identity and work done by specific attorneys in the case, have been omitted. 
Record cites have been added in brackets. 
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which ReMax was holding $25,000.00 earnest money and did not know to 
whom the money should be given. The Original Petition states that ReMax 
was "willing to deliver the Earnest Money to such persons as the Court may 
direct, or to pay or deliver it over to the Court." There is no mention of a 
claim for a commission earned. Complaint/Interpleader at 110 (November 17, 
2006). [R. 3.] 
On January 5, 2008, Seller, through its attorney Nina Cleere, filed its 
answer, counterclaimed against ReMax, and filed a third-party complaint 
against Tim Shea ("Shea") asserting that it is entitled to the $25,000.00 earnest 
money because Buyer backed out of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement and 
"[Buyer was] in collusion with Tim Shea and/or Remax Elite to have the 
property recorded in [Buyer's] name without payment to [Seller] and that 
Remax Elite then refused to release the Earnest Money as required under the 
Purchase Agreement due to this collusive relationship .... " 
Answer/Counterclaim at~ 10 (January 5, 2007). [R. 32.] 
On March 21, 2008, Buyer and Seller filed a stipulated motion to 
dismiss the claims between Buyer and Seller, which the court granted on 
March 31, 2008. Seller's and Schvaneveldt's claims against ReMax and Shea 
survived. All other claims were dismissed. Order on Stipulated Motion to 
Dismiss Claims Between Buyer and Seller (March 31, 2008). [R. 538.] 
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On June 9, 2008, ReMax and Shea, through LeBaron & Jensen, filed a 
"Motion for Leave to Amend" the November 17, 2006, Original Petition G.i 
arguing that "ReMax and Timothy Shea ... have claims against [Seller] that 
they would like to join in this action regarding a sales commission that was 
never paid to them after bringing a ready, able and willing buyer to Defendant 
[Seller]." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend at 2 (June 
9, 2008). [R. 556.] 
Sellers opposed the amendment for several reasons. Two of its 
principal reasons were (1) under Utah law, Shea was not allowed to advance a 
claim for a real estate commission, and (2) LeBaron & Jensen could not 
represent ReMax or Shea in pursuing the commission because they had 
previously represented Buyer. Memorandum in Opposition to ReMax and 
Tim Shea's Motion for Leave to Amend at 2 & 7 (June 23, 2008). [R. 591.] 
On September 2, 2008, the court granted ReMax's and Shea's Motion 
to Amend. The court, however, did not allow adoption of the proposed 
amended complaint that had been attached to the memorandum in support 
because the court agreed with Seller that Shea could not bring a claim for the 
commission in his own name. Instead, the court instructed: "[I]f Remax 
wishes to file its own counterclaim to collect the commission, it may do so." 
Ruling Granting Motion for Leave to Amend" at 4-5 (September 2, 2008). 
6 
The court did not accept Seller's argument that there was a conflict of interest 
between LeBaron & Jensen representing ReMax and Shea and its previous 
representation of Buyer. At this point LeBaron & Jensen began representing 
ReMax in its claim to obtain the commission. Attorney [Rob] Wallace 
continued to represent both ReMax and Shea in defending Seller's claims 
against them. [R. 556, 613.] 
On September 10, 2008, ReMax, through LeBaron & Jensen, filed an 
Amended Complaint stating three causes of action against Seller seeking the 
commission. Amended Complaint (September 10, 2008). [R. 660.] Shea's 
name does not appear on the Amended Complaint. Id 
Seller did not immediately answer the Amended Complaint, and ReMax 
brought a Motion to Compel Answers. Ultimately, on February 6, 2009, Seller 
filed ''Seller's Answer to ReMax Elite's Amended Complaint and Amended 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint." Seller, having already asserted its 
claims against ReMax and Shea in its previous "First Amended Counterclaim 
and Third-Party Complaint," did not reassert its claims against ReMax and 
Shea. It did, however, add "the Principal Broker and Remax owner's group ... 
as additional Third-Party Defendants." Seller's Answer to ReMax Elite's 
Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint 
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at 3 (February 6, 2009). [R. 828.] This is the first time that Hilary "Skip" 
Wing's name appears on any pleadings. 
On June 2, 2009, ReMax and Shea filed a "Second Motion for Leave to 
Amend" their complaint. This time they desired to add Schvaneveldt and 
Cathy Code ("Code") as Defendants. ReMax and Shea argued that during the 
course of discovery they learned new information concerning Schvaneveldt' s 
and Code's signatures on the For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement that 
justified adding them as parties. Memorandum in Support of Second Motion 
for Leave to Amend at 2-4 (June 1, 2009). [R. 866-68.] Seller opposed the 
motion, arguing that it was untimely, that it attempted to make individual 
representatives of an LLC personally liable for the claim, and that ReMax, as a 
defunct dba, did not have standing to sue for a commission claim. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Second Motion for Leave to Amend (June 23, ~ 
2009). [R. 927.] 
On August 12, 2009, the court granted ReMax and Shea's Second 
Motion for Leave to Amend. The court, however, did not allow Shea to assert 
a claim for the real estate commission or allow ReMax' s claim for quantum 
meruit. Ruling Granting Second Motion for Leave to Amend (August 12, 
2009). [R. 1081.] Wallace and LeBaron & Jensen filed the "Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim of Timothy Shea ... and Third Party 
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Complaint Against Cathy Code" ("Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim") adding Schvaneveldt and Code as defendants on September 
10, 2009. [R. 1232.] This is the first time that ReMax or Shea filed any claim 
against Schvaneveldt and the first time Code appeared as a party in any 
respect. 
On December 7, 2010, ReMax filed its "Third Motion to Amend" its 
complaint. ReMax argued that Defendants had repeatedly asserted that it did 
not have standing to bring the claims against them, and "[ w ]hile these 
particular motions are not well taken, the Plaintiff requests that this Court 
allow the plaintiff to amend to cut off the incessant filing of memoranda and 
motions about this issue that have bogged this case down." Memorandum in 
Support of Third Motion for Leave to Amend at 2 (December 7, 2010). [R. 
2321.] Ultimately, the matter of ReMax's Third Motion to Amend came 
before the court in a January 27, 2012 hearing. The court granted the motion 
to amend, and ReMax filed its "Third Amended Answer and Counter Claim of 
Timothy Shea ... and Third Party Complaint Against Code" on January 3 I, 
2012. Despite the title of the document, Shea did not reassert any 
counterclaims. All of the counterclaims were brought by "Elite Legacy 
Corporation D/B/A ReMax Elite, Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation D/B/A 
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Re/Max Elite, and Hilary Owen "Skip" Wing, principal broker D/B/ A as 
Re/Max Elite ... " [R. 3591.] 
On August 3, 2012, the parties met for a pretrial conference. For 
reasons the court cannot recall at this time, the claims against Still Standing 
Stables were released. Order Dismissing Defendant Still Standing Stable, L.C. 
with Prejudice (October 3, 2012). [R. 5613.] Accordingly, at the time of trial, 
only ReMax's claims against Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code survived. 
The jury trial was held on August 6, 7, 8, and 10. At the close of Plaintiffs 
case, Code moved for a directed verdict, which the court later granted. Order 
Dismissing Cathy Code With Prejudice (August 24, 2012). [R. 5423.] The 
jury found Schvaneveldt liable for ReMax's commission .... " Order and ~ 
Judgment on Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial (December 21, 2012). [R. 
5950.] 
On November 30, 2012, ReMax filed the instant Motion for a 
Determination of Attorney Fees, and on January 3, 2013, Code filed her 
Motion for Attorney Fees. ReMax, Code, and Still Standing Stables have also 
asserted that they are entitled to an award of costs. 
As noted, the foregoing procedural summary by the trial court was through the 
date of the motions for attorney fees filed by Mr. Wing and Ms. Code. Additional 
details regarding the arguments and concessions made by Mr. Wing in connection 
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with his motion for attorney fees, which are necessary to explain Ms. Code's 
argument of invited error, are set forth in the next section. Following two evidentiary 
hearings (R. 8390, 8391), the court granted both parties' motions. (R. 6732.) 
Skip Wing filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under U.R.Civ.P. 59 
(R. 6778), which the court denied. (R. 7009.) This appeal followed. 
Additional facts relevant to issues on appeal 
In his motion seeking fees against Mr. Schvaneveldt, Mr. Wing argued that an 
award of fees to a prevailing party in the litigation was mandatory under the FSBO: 
The Utah Code allows a court to award costs and attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in a civil action based upon any written contract when 
the provisions of that contract allow at least one party to recover 
attorney fees. U.C.A. § 78B-5-826 (2012). Where there is a right to 
attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the party who successfully 
prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to 
those claims on which the party was successful. 
The For Sale By Owner Agreement executed by ReMax Elite and Cathy 
Code on January 20, 2006 and ratified by Chuck Schvaneveldt. .. 
provides that "in any action or proceeding arising out of this 
Commission Agreement involving the Seller and/or the Company, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs." 
By its use of the word "shall," the provision makes the prevailing 
party's recovery of reasonable attorney fees mandatory. 
(R. 5681-82.) 
In opposing the motion, defendant Schvaneveldt argued that Skip Wing was 
not a client of the lawyers who prosecuted the case (i.e., whose fees were sought), 
and that the lawyers instead represented only Tim Shea, a real estate agent who had 
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signed the FSBO but was not a party to the litigation. Therefore, Mr. Schvaneveldt 
argued, Mr. Wing was not entitled to a fee award. (R. 5909-5921.) 
In response, Mr. Wing argued that he was in fact a client of the lawyers, that 
he was a party to the case, that he had sued to enforce the FSBO, that he had a 
personal stake in the litigation, that Mr. Schvaneveldt lacked standing to challenge 
the fee agreement between Mr. Wing and his attorneys, and that Mr. Wing was a 
prevailing party entitled to attorney fees under the FSBO. (R. 5867; R. 6668-71; see 
also p. 11, supra.) 
Mr. Wing reiterated these arguments at the hearing on his motion. For 
example, Mr. Wing's counsel argued repeatedly that Mr. Wing was a named 
plaintiff, that he was a prevailing party, and that he was entitled to fees under the ~ 
FSBO: 
• "I would argue that Remax Elite and the underlying entities doing business as 
ReMax Elite and Mr. Skip Wing did prevail in this case and that those 
attorney's fees are available." (R. 8390, p. 28.) 
• "And quite frankly, the way that we see it, Skip Wing, Remax Elite, all the 
underlying entities, any one of them, under legal theory, are entitled to recover 
and once again, we're looking at reasonable attorney's fees ..... It's reasonable 
attorney's fees here, so who cares who claims them?" (R. 8390, pp. 38-39.) 
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• "And I'd submit to you that we threw up all the plaintiffs that are entitled to 
their attorney's fees and we won. We think Skip Wing gets them because 
statutorily, he's allowed to enforce that contract, that's by statute becoming a 
party to the enforcement .... Skip Wing is, in fact, a party, able to enforce the 
FSBO, that was their own argument, we adopted it, we made them a party to 
this." (R. 8390, pp. 82, 86.) 
• "He's on the pleadings as the plaintiff." (R. 8390, p. 236 (referring to Mr. 
Wing); also p. 43 (stating that Skip Wing is the plaintiff in this case "for 
purposes of recovering it)" .2 
Mr. Wing argued that he had a personal stake in the litigation because, under 
the terms of an assignment between Mr. Wing and the agent, Tim Shea, Mr. Wing 
was to receive the first $10,000 from any recovery: 
[Hje [Mr. Wing] still has a stake in it. He has a $10,000 stake .... Once again, 
there's a $10,000 right there. 
(R. 8390, p. 100.) 
Mr. Wing's counsel argued: 
We showed up at trial. Skip Wing sat at plaintiffs table. I stood up in my 
opening argument and said, Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I rise up and I 
represent the plaintiffs in this case, including Skip Wing, who's sitting at my 
left at counsel table. We've made pleadings on behalf of Skip Wing, so this 
2 Mr. Wing's counsel also testified at the hearing that Mr. Wing had been involved in 
forming litigation strategy. (R. 8390, pp. 91-92 ("We had discussions with Skip 
Wing in which we discussed strategy[.]").) 
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whole idea that we can trip up Mr. Skip Wing in the deposition regarding 
settlement offers and make it look like I'm not his attorney and representing 
him is bogus .... I represent Mr. Skip Wing .... 
Of course most of my communication is with Tim Shea, but that doesn't 
mean that Skip Wing isn't my client. We've pled it, it's on all of our 
pleadings. When we sit there and say attorneys for plaintiffs and you look at 
the header and it says Skip Wing ... 
I get the idea that Skip Wing only has a $10,000 stake in this, that 
Remax Elite only has a $10,000 stake in this, but they still have a stake, they 
still have-they still have the statutory and contractual right to sue and I'll get 
to that in a second and we represented them as counsel in our pleadings, at trial 
and in our motions .... 
There's interesting issues here in terms of people's vested interest in this 
case, but once again, the assignment of the claim really is a red herring and 
really is irrelevant. First of all, it wasn't completely assigned. The parties had 
actually sued Remax Elite and Skip Wing still had a vested interest in the 
$10,000 and clearly, in our pleadings, we've appeared as counsel for those 
guys. 
Mr. Wing's counsel argued before trial that it was "ridiculous" for the 
defendants to suggest that Mr. Wing did not have a personal stake in the litigation: 
:MR. LeBARON (Mr. Wing's counsel): You know, that 
assignment, you know, when this argument came up, of course we were 
concerned about it and so we went back and looked at the assignment and our 
interpretation of that assignment is that he has assigned a right to pursue these 
claims. But Skip Wing, as the broker, reserves the first $10,000 from the 
proceeds, any proceeds that were recovered. And so Mr. -and I means it's not 
- so for the defendants to argue that Skip Wing has no dog in this fight is 
ridiculous because he does, I mean, he gets the first ten grand. 
THE COURT: And he is a party to this suit? 
:MR. LeBARON: And he is one of the plaintiffs, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then let's move on. 
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(R. 8382, p. 50:10-24; see also R. 6911 (arguing that, the assignment to Mr. 
Shea was not absolute, Mr. Wing retained the right "to maintain claims on his own 
behalf').) 
Mr. Wing's counsel confirmed that Mr. Wing had a separate attorney fee 
agreement and relationship with the plaintiffs' lawyers. For example, he argued: 
LeBaron & Jensen had an agreement with the Plaintiffs, albeit oral, to 
bill for attorney fees. Most importantly, LeBaron & Jensen filed huge 
amounts of documents over multiple years as Plaintiffs' attorney, 
produced Mr. Wing for deposition, and represented Plaintiffs at trial 
with Mr. Wing sitting at counsel table. Even Mr. Fuller [Schvaneveldt's 
trial counsel] in the email correspondence attached referred to Mr. Wing 
as LeBaron & Jensen's client. 
(R. 6672.) 
Testimony from Mr. Wing's counsel at the hearing on attorney fees 
reaffirmed that position: 
Q. And do you have an oral agreement w~th Skip Wing and Remax 
Elite that you would bill for? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was it your understanding that if Skip Wing prevailed that you 
would collect the attorney's fees? 
A. Yes .... I'm Mr. Wing's attorney and he understands that. 
(R. 8390, pp. 90, 100.) 
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Mr. Wing testified that, as a principal broker, it was his obligation to pursue 
real estate commissions on behalf of the agents under him, and that he was seeking 
attorney fees if he prevailed: 
Q. Okay, so as a broker, you really collect the commissions and then 
tum around and pay them? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And by law, is that what you're required to do? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So in this particular case, are you personally asking for 
any money, as Skip Wing? 
A. Personally, as myself. No. There's-
Q. Okay. Are you asking for money as Skip Wing, as the broker 
and on behalf of the brokerage? 
A. Yes .... 
Q. So you're suing to collect Tim Shea's commission? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But legally, you're the one asking for it today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And are you asking for the commission as it was set out in 
the for sale by owner agreement in this particular case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And are you also asking for the attorney's fees that go along with 
that contract? 
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A. Yes. 
(R. 8384, pp. 169-170, lines 3-23; see also id., p. 183, lines 7-22.) 
In response to Ms. Code's competing motion for attorney fees, Mr. Wing's 
sole argument was that he was not a party to the contract; he did not raise any 
"representative capacity" issues. (R. 6342.) 
After substantial briefing and two hearings, the trial collli: issued a ruling 
granting both motions for attorney fees. (R. 6732.) The court awarded Mr. Wing 
vJ and the other plaintiffs $147,371.00 in attorney fees against Mr. Schvaneveldt, and 
awarded Ms. Code $44,229.50. Id. 
Mr. Wing filed a Motion to Clarify Ruling and Order on the Parties' Motions 
for Attorney Fees "pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R. 
6778.) (Mr. Wing did not identify which subsection(s) of Rule 59(a) upon which he 
sought relief. (R. 6778; R. 6780-6787.).) In the motion, Mr. Wing argued for the 
first time that "Skip Wing has no personal contractual liability for fulfilling his 
statutory responsibility to collect a commission." (R. 6782.) 
The trial court denied Mr. Wing's Rule 59(e) motion on several grounds. The 
court's ruling began: 
The court's ruling continued a longstanding practice, advanced 
by Plaintiffs, of asserting that the "plaintiffs" functioned as a singular 
unit. Plaintiffs now seek to draw a distinction between Hilary "Skip" 
Wing, and the other Plaintiffs, arguing that Mr. Wing, unlike the other 
Plaintiffs, never asserted that he was a party to the For Sale By Owner 
17 
Agreement ("FSBO") on which Code's Motion for Attorney Fees was 
based, and, therefore, he cannot be held personally liable for Ms. Code's 
attorney fees. 
(R. 7009.) 
The trial court then identified several alternate bases for denying the motion. 
First, it rejected Mr. Wing's contention that he had never claimed to be a party to the 
FSBO, finding: 
Plaintiffs' January 31, 2012 Third Party Complaint against Cathy Code 
was filed by "Elite Legacy Corporation D/B/ A Re/Max Elite, 
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation D/B/A Re/Max Elite, and Hilary 
Owen "Skip" Wing, principal broker D/B/ A as Re/Max Elite 
(hereinafter "ReMax Elite" collectively) .... " Third Am. Answer and 
Countercl. Of Timothy Shea and ReMax Elite to the Third Party Comp 1. 
Of Still Standing Stables, L. C. and Chuck Schvaneveldt; and Third 
Party Compl. Against Cathy Code at 8 (Jan. 31, 2012). The Complaint 
never attempts to draw any distinctions between the various plaintiffs. 
Indeed, the Complaint collectively refers to the plaintiffs as "ReMax." 
Accordingly, when the collective "ReMax" asserted its claims against 
Cathy Code, Mr. Wing was included as a plaintiff, and Mr. Wing, like 
all of the plaintiffs, based his claim for a commission on the For Sale By 
Owner commission agreement containing the attorney fees provision. 
Mr. Wing's claim that he never claimed to be a party to the FSBO is 
unfounded. 
(R. 7010.) 
Second, the court ruled that Mr. Wing was liable for fees under Utah's 
reciprocal fee statute, stating: 
A party is entitled to reciprocal fee-shifting by statute when the 
provisions of a contract would have entitled at least one party to recover 
its fees had that party prevailed in a civil action based upon the contract. 
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Hooban v. Unicity Int'/, Inc., 285 P.3d 766, 772 (Utah 2012). 
Accordingly, because Mr. Wing, as part of the collective ReMax, 
asserted a cause of action against Ms. Code based upon the FSBO, and 
because Ms. Code prevailed on that cause of action, Mr. Wing, like the 
other plaintiffs, is liable for Ms. Code's attorney fees. 
(R. 7010.) 
The trial court found unpersuasive Mr. Wing's complaint that he only joined 
the lawsuit in response to standing arguments being raised by the defendants. ( As 
Mr. Wing explained, adding himself to the lawsuit was "a whole lot quicker, a whole 
lot more efficient than trying to deal with a defunct d/b/a". (R. 8390, p. 80.) See also 
R. 6902 ("the Plaintiffs named Skip Wing individually as a Plaintiff to avoid 
continued haranguing over a. non-issue"). The court also rejected Mr. Wing's 
speculation that exposure to fees would dissuade brokers from suing for 
commissions. The court wrote: 
The court finds Mr. Wing's policy arguments unpersuasive. 
First, it is unclear whether Mr. Wing had any obligation to join himself 
as a party in this suit. ReMax' s corporate entities had already asserted 
their claims for the commission, and, in response to Defendants' 
arguments that the corporate entities lacked standing, Mr. Wing added 
himself as a plaintiff. Plaintiffs argue that they only added Mr. Wing as 
a plaintiff out of an abundance of · caution and to avoid continued 
haranguing over what they viewed as a non-issue being raised by 
defendants. The reasons ·that Plaintiffs chose to add Mr. Wing as a 
party in this action, however, are immaterial. Mr. Wing must accept the 
natural consequences of naming himself a plaintiff. It was his decision 
to join himself as a plaintiff, unaided by anything Defendants did and 
uninfluenced by any order of this court indicating that it was necessary. 
The court has never ruled that Mr. Wing was a necessary party, and it 
need not do so now. The fact is, Mr. Wing was added as a plaintiff. 
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Second, assuming Mr. Wing was a required party, there is no 
incentive for Mr. Wing not to file this claim. Because Tim Shea was 
ultimately entitled to recover his commission, Mr. Wing had two 
choices: (1) he could file this claim and recover the commission on Mr. 
Shea's behalf, or (2) he could wait for Shea to sue him for the entire 
commission. The court fails to see how imposing attorney fees will 
alter this decision-making process. 
(R. 7010-11.) 
Finally, the trial court concluded that Mr. Wing could not claim benefits from 
the FSBO, yet avoid consequences of the same FSBO: 
Lastly, Mr. Wing cannot receive all of the benefits of the FSBO 
without accepting all of the risks associated with that agreement. Here, 
Mr. Wing successfully pursued an action against the defendant Chuck 
Schvaneveldt, and based on the very attorney fees provision he now 
seeks to avoid liability for, recovered attorney fees against Chuck 
Schvaneveldt. Allowing Mr. Wing to both recover attorney fees from 
Mr. Schvaneveldt and avoid liability for Ms. Code's attorney fees 
would be incongruous. 
(R. 7011.) 
Following the trial court's ruling on fees, defendants Schvaneveldt and Still 
Standing Stables filed various motions challenging again the plaintiffs' standing to 
pursue claims under tI:ie FSBO. Mr. Schvaneveldt argued primarily that the Remax 
Elite dba (signator on the FSBO) was not owned by any of the plaintiffs when the 
FSBO was signed, that the dba had expired, and that it had recently been purchased 
by defendant Still S~ding Stables. Therefore, the defendants argued, the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to pursue the claims on behalf of Remax Elite. (E.g., R. 7091.) 
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In response to the defendants' contentions, Mr. Wing argued that, as a 
principal broker, he had standing to enforce the FSBO. For example, he wrote: 
Defendants' standing arguments related to ownership of the dba fall 
apart because Skip Wing has statutory standing as the principal broker. 
The name of the contracting party is irrelevant. Utah Code Ann 61-2f-
409(2)(b) provides in pertinent part that "[ a]n action for the recovery of 
fee commission or other compensation may only be instituted and 
brought by the principal broker with whom sales agent or associate 
broker is affiliated Utah Code Ann 61-2f-409 2013. This statute doesn't 
delve into who the broker listed on the FSBO or the REPC is.... Instead 
it simply states that the principal broker may sue for the commission. 
Skip Wing has done so. 
(R. 8041 (emphasis in original).) 
The trial court ultimately denied the defendants' challenge to standing. The 
court's ruling included language upon which Mr. Wing relies heavily on appeal: 
The Court grants the request for modification of the fmdings as it relates 
to Mr. Skip Wing based upon his articulation in various statements that 
he did not individually own or control the rights that were being 
asserted in the litigation. That clarification will be that to the extent that 
Skip Wing is identified as a party in these proceedings, or as the holder 
of any claims, that identification is Mr. Skip Wing in his representative 
capacity as principal broker for the brokerage or as an agent or 
representative of the brokerage and does not represent his individual and 
personal ownership of those claims. The Court is not going to modify 
the findings to the extent of excluding Mr. Wing's name but will 
include the modification that to the extent that his name is included that 
is representation of his role in connection with the business entity and 
that that role was the role of principal broker representative agent or 
authorized representative of the brokerage. That clarification will be 
made to avoid any conclusion that the claims that are identified are 
individually and separately owned by Mr. Wing independent of his role 
in connection with the business entity proceedings or as the holder of 
any claims that are identified are individually and separately owned by 
Mr. Wing independent of his role in connection with the business entity. 
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(R. 8246-4 7.) 
Mr. Wing's brief states that "Cathy [Code] has not appealed this ruling," and 
otherwise implies that the ruling affected Ms. Code's fee award against him. (E.g., 
Br.Appt., p. 1 (Appellant's Issue No. 1), 5, 13, 14, 15.) In that regard, the brief 
contains a rather material omission, namely the court's express statement that the 
ruling did not apply to Ms. Code's award against Mr. Wing: The modification was 
solely for purposes of Mr. Wing's status as a judgment creditor in connection with 
the ( other defendants') motions before it, the trial court stated, and did not extend to 
Cathy Code's award of attorney fees against him: 
1v1R. LeBARON (Mr. Wing's counsel): "I don't think that issue 
[Mr. Wing's liability for Ms. Code's fees] is actually even before the 
Court right now ..... 
THE COURT: .. .I did not see any request for affirmative relief 
on the part of Skip Wing with respect to that modification. 
1v1R. LeBARON: That's correct. 
(R. 8445, pp. 47-49, lines 14-15.) 
:rv.tR. EDGAR (Ms. Code's trial counsel): .. .I still think Mr. 
Wing, even if he's taken off as a creditor, should remain as a debtor. I 
don't know if you want to hear argument on that, it wasn't really 
brought before the Court for today ... 
THE COURT: And I will to the extent that there's lack of clarity 
on the record, the Court's ruling is that that issue is not before the Court 
today. There has not been affirmative request for that relief and that is 
not before the Court. 
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(Id., pp. 100-101.) 
MR. EDGAR: And your Honor, do you intend your ruling to 
impact Mr. Wing's status as a judgment debtor? 
THE COURT: No. There is no ruling with respect to Mr. 
Wing's sta:tus as a judgment debtor. 
MR. EDGAR: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That issue is not before the Court today. 
(Id., pp. 114-115.) 
The court invited Mr. Wing to bring a motion if he felt the ruling would 
provide a basis for relief from the attorney fee award against him: 
MR. LeBARON: And I think the point being that he was - there was an 
order of attorney's fees based upon him having a personal claim in this case, 
him being a party to the contract. 
THE COURT: And I understand that and that-
MR. LeBARON: But it's not before the Court. 
THE COURT: -this ruling may certainly prompt other action to be 
taken, but that issue is not before the Court today and the Court, if that issue 
becomes an issue, I' 11 hear it when it comes before the Court .... 
(R. 8445, p. 115). Mr. Wing chose not to bring the issue before the trial court. 
(Record, passim.) Instead, he pursued the instant appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Wing's representative capacity argument was not properly preserved. It 
was only raised after judgment in a post-trial motion. The trial court was not given 
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an opportunity to address the issue, and thus there was a failure to preserve. 
Moreover, Mr. Wing invited the error, consistently asserting that as an individual 
he was a prevailing party. 
Notwithstanding deficiencies concemmg preservation and invitation of 
error, the trial court's ruling as to Mr. Wing's liability to pay fees was correct. He 
entered the litigation as an individual plaintiff and asserted a monetary stake in the 
outcome. He also asserted that he was acting as Tim Shea's principal. Moreover, 
he was seeking to enforce the FSBO contract-that is, he asserted its enforceability 
as a basis for recovery. His formal status as a "party" is not what matters under the 
applicable test set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. Rather, that test requires two 
elements: ( 1) does the contract provide for a prevailing party to collect fees, and 
(2) is the party against whom fees are sought to be awarded asserting the contract 
as a basis for recovery? Thus, what matters is whether Mr. Wing sought a 
recovery under the contract. And he clearly did. 
Mr. Wing attempts to avoid this result by asserting that he appeared in the 
lawsuit in a representative capacity only. Apart from the already-mentioned failure 
to preserve this argument, Mr. Wing's argument fails in two ways. First, he 
voluntarily added himself to the litigation and chose to proceed as an individual. 
Second, he asserted a personal stake in the recovery, and thus is distinct from an 
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agent merely asserting the rights of a principal on the principal' s behalf. (Such an 
agent cannot seek attorney fees.) 
Mr. Wing also asserts a "policy" argument that he should be exempt from 
·.J the attorney fee statute and FSBO language. This argument is contradicted by his 
litigation posture, in which he consistently asserted a stake in the FSBO's 
enforceability. He entered the lawsuit by choice, and choices have consequences. 
The supposed chill on broker activity _that Mr. Wing alleges has no basis in fact or 
theory, as there are in place myriad efficient mechanisms to protect brokers 
individually from fee awards ( such as insurance and indemnity agreements). 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. WING'S APPEAL FAILS ON THRESHOLD GROUNDS. 
A. Mr. Wing failed to preserve the issue on appeal and, in fact, 
invited the error. 
Mr. Wing characterizes the issue on appeal as: 
Did the trial court err in concluding that Plaintiff Hilary 'Skip' Wing was 
personally liable to Defendant Cathy Coe under Utah's reciprocal attorney-
fee statute (§78B-5-826) where Skip was a party to the litigation as a 
representative only, where Skip was not a party to the contract with the 
attorney-provision, and where Skip could not have been awarded attorney 
fees personally? 
(Br.Appt., p. I. Appellant's Issue No. 1.) 
Only one of these issues was preserved below. The issue of whether 
someone who is not a party to a contract can be liable for attorney fees was argued 
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(in fact, was the only argument) by Mr. Wing in opposing Cathy Code's motion for 
fees. See R. 6342. 
The separate ISsue of whether someone who allegedly brings suit in a 
representative capacity is subject to· fees was raised for the first time after 
judgment, in a Rule 59(e) motion. (R. 6778.) Additionally, the "representative 
capacity" modification upon which Mr. Wing relies related solely to a co-
defendant's motion regarding standing, and the trial court stated that it did not 
extend to Ms. Code's fee award. The court said it would consider a motion based 
on the modification if Mr. Wing believed it affected the Code award, but Mr. Wing 
elected not to file any such motion. Seep. 23, supra. Hence the trial court was 
never given an opportunity to address the issue, as required for preservation. See, 
e.g., Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, ~ 3, 330 P.3d 762. 
Equally fatal to his appeal, Mr. Wing invited the alleged error of which he 
currently complains. Mr. Wing repeatedly argued that he was an individually 
named plaintiff in the litigation, that he had "a dog in this fight," that he was a 
prevailing party · who "enforc[ ed]" the FSBO, that he was a "party to the 
enforcement" entitled to fees under the FSBO, that he had a separate representation 
agreement and attorney-client relationship with the plaintiffs' attorneys, and so 
forth. Seep. 11, supra. 
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B. Mr. Wing fails to challenge the trial court's findings or alternative 
grounds, or to apply the standard of review applicable to denial of 
a Rule 59 motion. 
As noted above, Mr. Wing first raised the issue of personal liability after 
judgment, in a Rule 59( e) motion. The trial court denied the motion on several 
alternate grounds, and made certain findings based on his familiarity with the case. 
For example, the court observed that the "plaintiffs" had themselves used the term 
to include Mr. Wing throughout the litigation. The court also found that Mr. Wing 
had asserted a claim that he was a party to the FSBO. See pp. 17-20, supra. 
On appeal, Mr. Wing fails to properly challenge the trial court's alternative 
grounds, which in itself compels affirmance. See Simmons Media Group v. 
Waykar, 2014 UT App 145, ,r,r 32-33 ("This court will not reverse a ruling of the 
district court that rests on independent alternative grounds where the appellant 
challenges only one of those. grounds."), and cases cited. He also fails to marshal 
the evidence in support of the court's findings, or to make any effort to establish an 
abuse of discretion. The trial court's judgment should accordingly be affirmed. 
II. IN ANY EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
THAT MR. WING WAS SUBJECT TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
vJ Mr. Wing's brief asserts three principal arguments. First, Mr. Wing argues 
that he "cannot be personally liable under § 78B-5-826" because he "was not a 
party to the FSBO and never asserted that he was a party to it." (Br.Appt., pp. 7-
12.) Second, Mr. Wing argues that he was involved in the litigation in a 
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representative capacity only, that "the true parties to the case are the real estate 
brokerages: Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation," 
and therefore cannot be subject to attorney fees. Id., pp. 12-16. Third, Mr. Wing 
argues that, "as a matter of law and policy, Skip is not liable under the FSBO if he 
cannot benefit from the FSBO." Id., pp. 17-21. Even if they had been preserved, 
none of these arguments withstands scrutiny. 
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion ( or commit clear error) 
in finding that Mr. Wing had asserted that he was a party to the 
contract. 
Mr. Wing's first argument is that, "When a litigant is not a party to a 
contract, that litigant is liable under the reciprocal fee statute only if the litigant 
claimed to be a party to the contract. Skip is not a party to the FSBO and never 
claimed to be a party to the FSBO." (Br.Appt., p. 6.) This assertion is both 
factually and legally incorrect. 
As noted above, the trial court made a factual determination that Mr. Wing 
had asserted that he was a party to the FSBO. Among other things, the court 
recognized that, throughout his involvement in the litigation - including the Third 
Party Complaint itself that brought Ms. Code into the litigation (R. 3598) - Mr. 
Wing had expressly included himself as one of the individual plaintiffs. See pp. 
17-20, supra. 
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As with any other factual determination, this finding should not be subject to 
reversal absent clear error. At a minimum, the court's assessment of the case 
history cannot be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See pp. 1-2, supra, 
Standard of Review; see also Wohnoutka, supra, 2014 UT App 154, ,r 3 ("A trial 
judge is in the best position to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, 
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record.") No such 
error exists. 
Mr. Wing's own counsel also argued repeatedly that Mr. Wing had a 
personal stake in the litigation (the first $10,000 recovered), that he had a separate 
attorney-client relationship with the lawyers, and that he was involved in 
discussing strategy for the case. He argued that he had both "statutory and 
contractual standi~g" to bring the claims. See pp. 13-17, supra. 
Under his own argument, Mr. Wing was suing as agent Tim Shea's 
principal. "The contract of the agent is the contract of the principal, and he may 
sue or be sued thereon though not named therein." Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 
P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992). Regardless of whether Mr. Wing's actual name was on 
the FSBO, under his own theory he was claiming to be a party entitled to enforce 
the contract. Whether he actually was a party to the contract is immaterial; the trial 
court found that he had claimed to be, and Mr. Wing has not challenged that 
finding. 
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B. The Utah reciprocal fee provision requires only that a party to 
litigation seek to "enforce" a contract, which Mr. Wing conceded 
he had done. 
Apart from the foregoing, Mr. Wing's first argument is based upon a 
misapprehension of the law. There is nothing in Utah's reciprocal fee statute that 
allows a party to avoid fees by disclaiming formal "party" status to the contract it 
is seeking to enforce. Nor is Mr. Wing's argument supported by Utah case law. 
In Hooban v. Unicity Int'/, 2012 UT 40, ,r 14, the Supreme Court clarified 
the two - and only two - requirements that must be met to receive fees under Utah 
Code § 78B-5-826. Fees may be awarded "upon satisfaction of two conditions,'' 
the court held: "(a) the provisions of the contract at issue must allow at least one 
party to recover fees if that party had prevailed and (b) the underlying litigation 
must be based upon a contract in the sense that a party to the litigation must assert 
the writing's enforceability as basis for recovery." 
This two-step process was reaffirmed in Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 
UT 47,321 P.3d 1021, in which the court wrote: 
In Hooban_ v. Unicity International, Inc., we recently established that a . 
party is entitled to reciprocal fee-shifting by statute when the provisions of a 
contract would have entitled at least one party to recover its fees had that 
party prevailed in a civil action based upon the,contract. The statute consists 
of a conditional if/then statement: ( a) If the provisions of a written contract 
allow at least one party to recover attorney fees in a civil action based upon 
the contract, (b) then a court may award attorney fees to either party that 
prevails. An action is based upon a contract under the statute if a party to 
the litigation asserts the writing's enforceability as basis for recovery. 
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Id., ,r 24 ( quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
Hooban and Farias are fairly straightforward, and easy to apply in this case: 
1) The FSBO allowed at least one party to recover fees if that 
party had prevailed. It states: "In any action or proceeding 
arising out of this Commission Agreement involving the Seller 
and/ or Company, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees and costs." (Add.Exh. B, ,r 8.) Mr. 
Wing acknowledged that this provision not only allowed, but 
required, attorney fees to a prevailing party in the litigation. (R. 
5681-82.) Ms. Code was a prevailing party. 
2) The underlying litigation must be based upon a contract "in the 
sense that a party to the litigation must assert the writing's 
enforceability as basis for recovery."· That is also undisputed: 
Mr. Wing himself repeatedly stated that he was seeking to 
"enforce" the written FSBO. See pp. 12-13, supra. 
There is nothing in the wording of the statute, or in Hooban or Farias, that 
allows a losing party to avoid fees by disclaiming formal party status under the 
contract the party is trying to enforce. Nor would such an interpretation make 
sense. Real estate agents commonly sign commission agreements with potential 
sellers or buyers, as Tim Shea did here. Agents are not allowed to sue for the 
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commissions in court, however; only their principal brokers can do that. See Utah 
Code § 61-2f-409. As Mr. Wing explained, an agent's principal broker brings the 
claim for the entire commission, and then pays the agent whatever he is entitled to 
from it. See p. 16, supra. 
Under Mr. Wing's theory, the attorney fee provision in a FSBO would be 
rendered meaningless: The real estate agent who signed the FSBO would not be 
liable for fees because the agent would not have been a party to the litigation. The 
principal broker who was a party to the litigation would not be liable because he 
did not sign the FSBO. A seller or buyer who successfully defends against a 
commission claim would be left with an unenforceable right to attorney fees. 
Mr. Wing cannot argue that these sellers/buyers would be protected because 
they might in some instances be able to obtain an award against another entity that 
might form part of the principal broker's "brokerage". There is no requirement 
that a principal broker create or own any entity; brokers are permitted to and often 
do act individually. (Indeed, it appears that only individuals can be principal 
brokers under the statute. 3) 
3 The applicable law in 2007 was the Division of Real Estate chapter of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, codified at Utah Code §§ 61-2-1 through 28. This statute 
was repealed in 2010. Former section 61-2-2(9) allowed for a "person" to be a 
broker. Case law had interpreted "person" in this context to include either an 
individual or a corporation. Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P .2d 876, 
878 (Utah 1983). However, section 61-2-6 made it clear that a licensed human 
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Moreover, even if a principal broker did bring an entity into his so-called 
brokerage, a prevailing party should still have a right to collect against all of the 
parties who chose to pursue a meritless claim against her - particularly if the 
principal broker is the only losing party with any assets. As Mr. Wing 
acknowledges, the entities claimed to be part of his "brokerage" - Aspen wood and 
Elite Legacy "ceased operating years ago." (Memorandum Opposing Appellant's 
Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 10, citing R. 2153, 8345, p. 164:13-18.) 
ill. WING'S ARGUMENT THAT HE WAS "INVOLVED IN TIDS CASE 
IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ONLY" IS UNSUPPORTED 
AND UNAVAILING. 
Mr. Wing's second argument is that "Skip cannot be personally liable for an 
award of attorney fees because Skip is not personally involved in this lawsuit. The 
being was required for a brokerage to function as such: An "applicant" was 
required to complete an approved educational program not to exceed 120 hours, 
and demonstrate three years full-time experience as a real estate sales agent or its 
equivalent before applying for and securing a principal broker license. Obviously, 
an individual was the only applicant contemplated under this section; it follows 
that an entity operating as a principal broker would be required to have as one of 
its principals a broker to confer upon the entity licensed status. The new statute 
apparently recognized the inferential leap that had previously been required to 
allow an entity to operate with a "license," and clarified that only an "individual" 
can be a principal broker. Utah Code § 61-2f-102(18). The statute also clarifies 
that a license is required to operate as a principal broker, much as was required by 
the former statute. Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2f-201. This does not mean that a broker 
cannot use the corporate form. A broker, when doing so, merely creates a 
"brokerage," now defined by regulation: "'Brokerage' means a real estate sales or 
a property management company." Utah Admin. Code Rule 162-2f-102(6). Under 
either the old or new statutory scheme, a licensed individual is required for the 
rights of a broker to be exercised. 
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true plaintiffs in this case are the real estate brokerages: Aspenwood Real Estate 
Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation. Skip was added to this litigation as a 
representative only. This is what the trial court found and this is clearly established 
in the record." (Br.Appt., p. 12-13.) This argument lacks merit in several respects. 
A. Mr. Wing did not preserve this issue, the trial court did not make 
any findings on it, and Mr. Wing has not challenged the trial 
court's refusal to apply findings in another context to Ms. Code in 
the absence of a motion. 
As noted above, Mr. Wing never raised any issue regarding "personal 
capacity" liability until after judgment, when he filed a Rule 59( e) motion. This 
failure to raise the issue was particularly problematic because, by that point, the 
parties had exchanged significant briefing, and two evidentiary hearings had been 
held. IfMr. Wing wanted to address the capacity in which he pursued claims against 
Ms. Code, that would be have been the time. 
Long afterward, solely in the context of motions filed by other defendants 
regarding standing, a modification was issued that Mr. Wing would remain a 
judgment creditor against defendant Schvaneveldt in a representative capacity only. 
Again as noted above, the trial court refused to expand this ruling to Mr. Wing's 
status as a judgment debtor of Ms. Code. If Mr. Wing believed that the ruling 
affected Ms. Code's judgment, the court said, he could bring a motion and the court 
would consider it. See pp. 22-23, supra. Mr. Wing did not do so, and he cannot now 
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challenge the trial court's refusal to do something ( make findings as to the capacity in 
which claims were asserted against Ms. Code) that was never requested. 
B. Mr. Wing's legal assumptions are incorrect in any event. 
Mr. Wing's arguments confuse the notion of responsibility as a litigant with 
ultimate liability. The statute allows for collection of fees against those participating 
in litigation no matter their "representative" status. Perhaps such litigants will be 
indemnified by those they represent, but as far as the statute is concerned, fees are 
awarded against those who are parties to the litigation. 
Wing's analysis supposes that Wing was a stranger to the contract in the same 
sense that an officer is a stranger to an entity's contract. There are material 
differences, however. First, Wing voluntarily added himself to the litigation, not 
only knowing that there was an attorney fee provision at issue, but affirmatively 
testifying that he was seeking fees under that provision. See pp.19-20, supra. 
He says he did so out of an abundance of caution ( or, as he admitted below, 
because it was "quicker"). Or perhaps it was because, as he acknowledged, claims 
for commissions in Utah must be brought by a principal broker, and Mr. Wing was 
the only principal broker involved. Wing construed his presence as required - or at 
least expedient - to convey all-important statutory standing, beyond whatever 
standing was present ( or not present) with Aspen wood or Elite Legacy as plaintiffs. 
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An abundance of caution cuts both ways. Mr. Wing must acknowledge that 
the benefit he received by appearing himself carries with it the burden of having been 
a direct adversary to Code, and the consequences ( attorney fees) such status might 
bring. His appearance, according to his own argument, was curative and allowed the 
contract to be enforced. He was thus no different from Mr. Hooban. 
The cases cited by Wing do not state differently. "Representative" capacity 
still requires an individual personal representative, shareholder derivative claimant, 
or class representative to appear in the suit and prosecute it. They are not immune 
from liability for fees ( although they may have recourse to the estate, corporation, or 
trust for indemnity). Wing chose to appear as an individual and not allow the entities 
in the brokerage to forge ahead on their own. His role was distinct from theirs, and 
he clearly was choosing to proceed in his individual capacity. This fact alone 
distinguishes the cases. 
Wing also argues that "an agency relationship with a principal to a contract 
does not give the agent the authority to enforce a contractual term for the agent's own 
benefit." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, ,r24. In Fericks, a realtor 
was barred from enforcing a REPC on behalf of a party to it. Using simple contract 
analysis, the court stated that the realtor was not a party, and therefore could not sue 
under the contract; accordingly, it could not invoke the attorney fee provision of the 
contract. In this case, of course, as an alleged principal broker, Mr. Wing could sue 
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under the contract. In any event, Fericks predates Hooban and is distinguishable, 
where Mr. Wing claimed enforcement of the contract as the basis of his own 
recovery, and where he claimed a personal stake in the recovery. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REJECTING MR. WING'S "POLICY" ARGUMENTS. 
A party cannot cite "policy" concerns to avoid the plain language of a statute. 
Moreover, a desire to apply so-called policy considerations is not a permitted basis 
for relief under Rule 59(e). See U.R.Civ. 59(a) (listing grounds for relief under Rule 
59). 
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disagreeing with 
Wing's stated policy concerns. Mr. Wing's claim that he "will not and legally cannot 
receive any personal benefit from this lawsuit" is baldly contradicted by his repeated 
arguments below that he would personally receive $10,000 from any recovery, and 
his emphasis that the assignment of his claims to Mr. Shea was only partial. See pp. 
13-17, supra. 
As the trial court noted, the fact that Mr. Wing chose to add himself to the 
lawsuit for expedience ("to bolster Elite Legacy's and Aspenwood's claim to 
standing") was a personal choice. The court had not ordered it, and Mr. Wing simply 
chose to do it because it would be easier than actually litigating the issue. It was not 
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to point out that choices have consequences. 
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It was also not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to reject Mr. Wing's 
speculation that brokers might be chilled from pursuing commissions if they faced 
attorney fee exposure. Of course, a broker would be exposed to fees only if he had 
pursued an unearned commission; Mr. Wing does not explain how public policy 
would support the bringing of illegitimate claims. Regardless, however, Mr. Wing's 
claimed concerns can easily be addressed by indemnification and insurance 
agreements. Additionally, as the trial court pointed out, brokers remain incentivized 
to pursue meritorious commissions because under Utah law, agents are authorized to 
sue a broker who refuses to pursue a commission. Utah Code§ 61-2f-409(2)(a). 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of its factual premises, 
or in its conclusion that choices have consequences. Choosing to sue someone on a 
contract that contains a known attorney provision has risks, and Mr. Wing voluntarily 
assumed. The trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
As discussed above, Ms. Code was correctly awarded attorney fees against 
Mr. Wing pursuant to the FSBO and Utah Code § 78B-5-826. Accordingly, she 
should also be awarded her attorney fees and expenses on appeal. The Utah 
Supreme Court "interpret[s] attorney fee status broadly so as to award attorney fees 
on appeal where a statute initially authorizes them." Dillon v. Southern 
Management Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ~ 61, 326 P.3d 656. Moreover, 
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"when a party is entitled to attorney fees below and prevails on appeal, that party is 
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellee Cathy Code respectfully requests the 
Court affirm the judgment, and to award Ms. Code her attorney fees and expenses 
incurred on appeal. 
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2015. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
~JP~ 
Karra J. Porter 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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JUN O 6 2013 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IIlLARY "SKIP" WING, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER ON THE 
PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. 060906802 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
This matter is before the court on three separate issues: (I) Defendants Still Standing 
Stables and Cathy Code's Memorandum of Costs; (2) Defendant Cathy Code's Motion for 
Attorney Fees; and (3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Determination and Award of Attorney Fees. Issues 
2 and 3 have been fully briefed and the court has heard evidence and oral argument. Plaintiffs 
failed to filed an objection to issue 1, but made oral arguments in opposition during a hearing on 
this matter. Pursuant to the following, each motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
Background 
This case started on November 17, 2006, when Petitioner ReMax Elite ("ReMax''), 
through its attorney Timothy Stewart of the firm Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford filed a 
Petition ("Original Petition") naming Still Standing Stables L.C. ("Seller" or "SSS") and Emmett 
Warren/Assign WBL Development LLC ("Buyer") as Respondents. The Original Petition 
sought declaratory relief regarding a contract dispute between Buyer and Seller in which ReMax 
was holding $25,000.00 earnest money and did not know to whom the money should be given. 
( ,t· . \ 
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The Original Petition states that ReMax was ''willing to deliver the Earnest Money to such 
persons as the Court may direct, or to pay or deliver it over to the Court.,, There is no mention of 
a claim for a commission earned. Complaint/Interpleader at ,r 10 (November 17, 2006). 
On January 5, 2008, Seller, through its attorney Nina Cleere, filed its answer, 
counterclaimed against ReMax, and filed a third-party complaint against Tim Shea ("Shea") 
asserting that it is entitled to the $25,000.00 earnest money because Buyer backed out of the Real 
Estate Purchase Agreement and "[Buyer was] in collusion with Tim Shea and/or Remax Elite to 
have the property recorded in [Buyer's] name without payment to [Seller] and that Remax Elite 
then refused to release the Earnest Money as required under the Purchase Agreement due to this 
collusive relationship .... " Answer/Counterclaim at 1110 (January 5, 2007). 
On January 18, 2007, Buyer, through its attorney L. Miles LeBaron of the law firm 
Lebaron & Jensen, P .C., filed its answer, crossclaimed against Seller, and filed a third-party 
complaint against Seller's principal Chuck Schvaneveldt ("Schvaneveldt"). Buyer's complaint 
alleged seven causes of action each relying on the assertion that Seller breached the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract by misrepresenting that the property included an easement which provided 
access to the property, failing to provide a "standard owner's policy of title insurance," and 
failing to provide a warranty deed. Answer, Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint at ,r,r 27-29 
(January 18, 2007). 
On February 7, 2007, Attorney Robert Fuller ("Fuller") entered his appearance as counsel 
for Seller and Schvaneveldt. Notice of Appearance (February 7, 2007). 1 On April 16, 2007, 
Fuller filed Seller's and Schvaneveldt's "First Amended Counterclaim and Third-party 
1 Nina Cleere never filed a Notice of Withdrawal, but, as far as the court is aware, she has not been involved in this 
case since she filed Seller's January 5, 2007, "Answer/Counterclaim." 
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Complaint" to specifically include claims of Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract 
against ReMax and Shea. "First Amended Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint" (April 16, 
2007). 
On April 24, 2007, Buyers amended their "Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint." 
There were not any substantive changes. Amended Answer, Crossclaim and Third Party 
Complaint (April 24, 2007). 
On May 14, 2007, both ReMax and Shea, through attorney Robert Wallace ("Wallace") 
of the law firm Kirton & McConkie, filed their Answers to Seller's and Schvaneveldt's "First 
Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint." Answer of ReMax Elite to The 
Counterclaim of Still Standing Stables, L.C. and Chuck Schvaneveldt (May 14, 2007) and 
Answer of Tim Shea to the Third Party Complaint of Still Standing Stables, L.C. and Chuck 
Schvaneveldt (May 14, 2007). 
After these pleadings, Buyer and Seller conducted discovery and negotiated settlement. 
ReMax and Shea also participated in discovery. On March 21, 2008, Buyer and Seller filed a 
stipulated motion to dismiss the claims between Buyer and Seller, which the court granted on 
March 31, 2008. Seller's and Schvaneveldt's claims against ReMax and Shea survived. All 
other claims were dismissed. Order on Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Claims Between Buyer and 
Seller (March 31, 2008). 
On June 9, 2008, ReMax and Shea, through LeBaron & Jensen, filed a "Motion for Leave 
to Amend'' the November 17, 2006, Original Petition arguing that "ReMax and Timothy Shea .. 
. have claims against [Seller] that they would like to join in this action regarding a sales 
commission that was never paid to them after bringing a ready, able and willing buyer to 
67.34 
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Defendant [Seller]." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend at 2 (June 9, 
2008). ReMax and Shea justified their delay in bring this claim stating: 
... [T]hey originally hoped that [Seller] and [Buyer] would settle this case and 
that ReMax and Shea could just move on with life. This is primarily because the 
insurance provider for ReMax Elite and Shea only provides representation for 
defensive claims and not for ReMax Elite and Shea's offensive claims. ReMax 
and Shea were hoping to avoid litigation because when the complaint was 
originally filed they did not want to commit the financial resources to obtain 
counsel as they perceived this fight to be between [Seller] and [Buyer]. Since that 
time, the above parties reached a settlement, but [Seller] has continued to pursue 
its claims against ReMax and Shea. In addition, ReMax and Shea have reached 
an agreement with counsel and are being represented in their offensive claims by 
LeBaron & Jensen, L.C. 
Id. at 2-3. Despite the fact that the Motion to Amend was brought by both ReMax and Shea, the 
proposed Amended Complaint attached to the motion only named Shea as a plaintiff. 
Sellers opposed the amendment for several reasons. Two of its principal reasons were (1) 
under Utah law, Shea was not allowed to advance a claim for a real estate commission, and (2) 
LeBaron & Jensen could not represent ReMax or Shea in pursuing the commission because they 
had previously represented Buyer. Memorandum in Opposition to ReMax and Tim Shea's 
Motion for Leave to Amend at 2 & 7 (June 23, 2008). 
On September 2, 2008, the court granted ReMax's and Shea's Motion to Amend. The 
court, however, did not allow adoption of the proposed amended complaint that had been 
attached to the memorandum in support because the court agreed with Seller that Shea could not 
bring a claim for the commission in his own name. Instead, the court instructed: "[I]fRemax 
wishes to file its own counterclaim to collect the commission, it may do so." Ruling Granting 
Motion For Leave to Amend" at 4-5 (September 2, 2008). The court did not accept Seller's 
argument that there was a conflict of interest between LeBaron & Jensen representing ReMax 
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and Shea and its previous representation ofBuyer.2 At this point LeBaron & Jensen began 
representing ReMax in its claim to obtain the commission. Attorney Wallace continued to 
represent both ReMax and Shea in defending Seller's claims against them. 
On September 10, 2008, ReMax, through LeBaron & Jensen, filed an Amended 
Complaint stating three causes of action against Seller seeking the commission. Amended 
Complaint (September 10, 2008). Shea's name does not appear on the Amended Complaint. Id. 
Seller did not immediately answer the Amended Complaint, and ReMax brought a 
Motion to Compel Answers. Ultimately, on February 6, 2009, Seller filed "Seller's Answer to 
ReMax Elite's Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint." 
Seller, having already asserted its claims against ReMax and Shea in its previous "First 
Amended Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint," did not reassert its claims against ReMax 
and Shea. It did, however, add "the Principal Broker and Remax owner's group ... as additional 
Third-Party Defendants." Seller's Answer to ReMax Elite's Amended Complaint and Amended 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint at 3 (February 6, 2009). This is the first time that 
Hilary "Skip" Wing's name appears on any pleadings. 
On June 23, 2009, Attorney Wallace, ReMax and Shea's defense counsel, filed a Motion 
to Strike Seller's Arn.ended Third-Party Complaint because it added new third-party defendants 
without obtaining leave from the court. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Still 
Standing Stables' Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint" (June 23, 2009). The 
Motion was briefed, but was never submitted for decision. 
2 No party raised any potential conflict of interest issue concerning joint representation of Shea and ReMax at this 
time. 
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On June I, 2009, ReMax and Shea filed a "Second Motion for Leave to Amend" their 
complaint. This time they desired to add Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code ("Code") as Defendants. 
ReMax and Shea argued that during the course of discovery they learned new inf onnation 
concerning Schvaneveldt's and Code's signatures on the For Sale By Owner Commission 
Agreement that justified adding them as parties. Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for 
Leave to Amend at 2-4 (June 1, 2009). Seller opposed the motion, arguing that it was untimely, 
that it attempted to make individual representatives of an LLC personally liable for the claim, 
and that ReMax, as a defunct dba, did not have standing to sue for a commission claim. 
Memorandwn in Opposition to Second Motion for Leave to Amend (June 23, 2009). 
On June 12, 2009, Timothy Stewart filed a Notice of Withdrawal from representing 
ReMax. This Notice appears to be a mere formality as all ofReMax's filings after the Original 
Petition were submitted by either Attorney Wallace or LeBaron & Jensen. 
On August 12, 2009, the court granted ReMax and Shea's Second Motion for Leave to 
Amend. The court, however, did not allow Shea to assert a claim for the real estate commission 
or allow ReMax' s claim for quantum meruit. Ruling Granting Second Motion for Leave to 
Amend (August 12, 2009). Wallace and LeBaron & Jensen filed the "Second Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim of Timothy Shea ... and Third Party Complaint Against Cathy Code" 
("Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim") adding Schvaneveldt and Code as defendants on 
September IO, 2009. Despite the court's plain direction to the contrary, the complaint was 
brought in Shea's and ReMax's name and asserted a claim for quantum meruit. It is ambiguous 
whether ReMax was included on the claim of breach of contract for the real estate commission 
because page 9 paragraph 10 does not assert the cause of action on ReMax' s behalf, but page 9 
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paragraph 9 refers to the commission as "their commission," referring to both ReMax and Shea. 
Second Amended Answer (September 10, 2009). This is the first time that ReMax or Shea filed 
any claim against Schvaneveldt and the first time Code appeared as a party in any respect.3 On 
October 8, 2009, the Second Amended Answer was served on Schvaneveldt and Code. Return of 
Service (October 16, 2009). 
On October 13, 2009, Seller, through Attorney Fuller, filed its answer to ReMax and 
Shea's Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim and moved to strike portions of the 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint against Cathy Code. The Motion to Strike asserted 
multiple reasons to strike the complaint, including an argument that ReMax and Shea violated 
the court's order not to include any claims by Shea and not to include a claim for quantum 
meruit. On October 30, 2009, Schvaneveldt filed his own answer and joined Seller's Motion to 
Strike. On November 5, 2009, Code, through her attorneys Robert Sykes ("Sykes'') and Allison 
Carter ("Carter"), filed her Answer to ReMax's Third-Party Complaint. This was the first action 
by Code in this case. 
On January 19, 2010, the court issued an order rejecting all of Seller's and 
Schvaneveldt' s argwnents asserted in their Motion to Strike, but also stated: "The Court has 
already ruled that [Shea's claim for a commission and the claim for quantum meruit] are futile, 
and they have been stricken. No further action by the Court is necessary." Ruling Denying 
Motion to Strike (January 19, 2010). 
Sykes and Carter, along with other employees of Sykes' firm, represented Code until she 
terminated them in July 2010. During that time Sykes filed Code's Answer, drafted and argued a 
3 Buyer had previously brought a third-party complaint against Schvaneveldt, but those claims were dismissed as 
part of the March 31, 2008 "Order on Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Claims Between Buyer and Seller." 
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rule 56(f) motion in response to ReMax's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, conducted 
discovery, and monitored the progress of the case as advanced by Seller and Schvaneveldt's 
counsel, Fuller. 
On July 12, 2010, after Code discharged Sykes, William 0. Kimball ("Kimball"), an in-
house attorney for Stake Center Locating. Inc., a company in which Schvaneveldt owns a fifty 
percent interest, filed a Notice of Appearance as counsel for Code. He brought himself up to 
speed on the case, and on September 3, 2010, Code moved for summary judgment on the issue of 
attorney fees related to Shea's claim against Code. Memorandum in Support of Cathy Code's 
Motion for Summary Judgment for Attorney Fees Against Timothy Shea (September 3, 2010). 
Code relied on Shea's admission in his responses to her First Request For Admissions to 
establish that Shea had sued her on or about September 8, 2009, for recovery of a commission 
owed under a For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement which contained a provision for 
attorney fees to the prevailing party of any action or proceeding arising out of the agreement.4 
Code argued that Shea's claims against Code had been dismissed in a ruling dated August 12, 
2010. 
On September 7, 2010, Shea, through LeBaron & Jensen, filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees. Shea did not dispute that he 
had sued Code for a commission or that the court had ruled on August 12, 2010, that he could 
not recover a commission. Rather, Shea argued that he was not a party to the contract. 
On November 1, 2010, the court issued an "Interim Ruling on Defendant Cathy Code's 
Motion for Attorney Fees." The court, reciting-the background of the issue, stated: 
4 Code's Request for Admissions states: "Request 2: Admit that you sued Cathy Code on or about September 8, 
2009. Request 2. Admit." 
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In September of 2009, Shea and Remax filed a third-party complaint, asserting 
four causes of action against Code arising from the commission agreement .... 
The breach of contract claim was brought solely by Shea, while the other three 
claims were brought jointly by Shea and Remax. Though Remax's claims still 
remain, all four of the claims brought by Shea were dismissed through summary 
judgment. Code then filed her motion for attorney fees. 
Interim Ruling on Defendant Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees at 2 (November I, 2010). 
The court then proceeded to evaluate the motion for attorney fees and because it had difficulty 
understanding guidance provided by Hooban v. Unicity Int'/, Inc., 220 P.3d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 
2009), cert. granted, 225 P .3d 880 (Utah 20 I 0), the court acknowledged that it was unsure how 
to proceed. 5 Ultimately, the court ruled: 
If the parties feel they can provide the Court with additional insight, they are 
encouraged to further brief the narrow issue of how the court should exercise its 
discretion in this motion, once this case has reached a final resolution. If the 
parties choose not to brief this issue further, the Court will take the position that 
the motion for attorney fees is denied. 
Interim Ruling on Defendant Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees at 5. Code never 
submitted any supplemental memoranda on this particular motion, and the matter was never 
resubmitted for decision. 
On December 13, 2010, Code, through Attorney Kimball, again moved for an award of 
Attorney Fees against Shea pursuant to the bad faith statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-825. 
Memorandum in Support of Cathy Code's Motion for Summary Judgment for Attorney Fees in 
Accordance with U.C.A. § 78B-5-825 (December 13, 2010). Code argued that Shea had filed his 
claims against her in bad faith because he had knowledge that they were meritless when the court 
told him_ so in its September 8, 2008 ruling, among other factors. On January 7, 20 I 1, there were 
s Hooban has since been reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision is much clearer 
concerning the issues raised by Code's claim for Attorney Fees. 
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nine motions awaiting decision by the court including ReMax's "Third Motion to Amend,, and 
Code's motion for attorney fees. The court ordered that it would 
not rule on any of the pending motions until a request to submit for decision is 
filed on ReMax's motion to amend and the Court has issued its ruling on that 
motion .... [I]f any party determines that any of the remaining motions 
necessitates a ruling from the Court, that party must file a new request to submit 
for decision. 
Order at 3 (January 7, 2011). Code objected to the November 7, 2011 ruling, arguing that her 
second motion for fees was ripe for decision but did not file a new request to submit. Cathy 
Code's Objection to This Court's Order Dated January 7, 2011 (January 18, 2011). 
On December 7, 2010, ReMax filed its "Third Motion to Amend" its complaint. ReMax 
argued that Defendants had repeatedly asserted that it did not have standing to bring the claims 
against them, and "[w]hile these particular motions are not well taken, the Plaintiff requests that 
this Court allow the plaintiff to amend to cut off the incessant filing of memoranda and motions 
about this issue that have bogged this case down." Memorandum in Support of Third Motion for 
Leave to Amend at 2 (December 7, 20 I 0). On December 17, 20 I 0, the court granted Seller's 
motion to enforce a mandatory dispute resolution agreement. Ruling Granting Defendant's 
Motion to Enforce Mandatory Dispute Resolution Agreement (December 17, 2010). This ruling, 
along with a stay of proceedings to deal with Shea's pending bankruptcy, caused a delay in 
proceedings for nearly two years. Ultimately, the matter ofReMax's Third Motion to Amend 
came before the court in a January 27, 2012 hearing. The court granted the motion to amend, 
and ReMax filed its "Third Amended Answer and Counter Claim of Timothy Shea ... and Third 
Party Complaint Against Code" on January 31, 2012. Despite the title of the document, Shea did 
not reassert any counterclaims. All of the counterclaims were brought by "Elite Legacy 
·" 
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Corporation D/B/ A ReMax Elite, Aspenwood Real Estate Corpoartion D/B/ A Re/Max Elite, and 
Hilary Owen "Skip" Wing, principal broker D/B/A as Re/Max Elite .... " The complaint again 
brought a claim for Unjust Enrichment/Quantum Meruit, which the court had previously 
dismissed. 
Over the next year, there were various motions for summary judgment and other matters. 
These motions narrowed the issues to be presented at trial. Kimball eventually stopped 
representing Code, but never filed a notice of withdrawal. Accordingly, it is unclear when his 
representation stopped. The last memorandum that Kimball filed with the court was a March 28, 
2011 "Memorandwn in Opposition to [Plaintiffs] Motion for Protective Order." The last 
hearing he participated in was a September 27, 2011 telephone conference. Around September 
2011, Attorney Kenneth Childs ("Childs") began representing Code. Affadavit of Kenneth P. 
Childs (February 27, 2013). Childs is also in-house counsel for Stake Center Locating. Inc. His 
affidavit reflects that he spent significant time reviewing the case and helped Fuller prepare for 
trial, do legal research, and strategize. Child's affidavit attributes 63.5 of the 104.75 hours that 
he worked on the case to defending Code. Beginning in 2012, it appears that Fuller began 
representing Code because from February 2012 until the trial in August 2012 Fuller filed several 
motions on behalf of Seller, Schvaneveldt, and Code. Code's current motion for attorney fees, 
however, does not request any of Fuller's fees. 
On May 22, 2012, the court granted ReMax's and the remaining Counterclaim 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing all of Still Standing Stables' claims 
against them. Order on Motions for Summary Judgment (May 22, 2012). On July 17, 2012, the 
court declined to reconsider the dismissal ~d indicated that the ruling also applied to 
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Schvaneveldt's and Code's Third Party Complaints which they tried to add by amendment. 
Rulings and Order on Pending Motions (July 17, 2012). 
About two weeks before the August 2012 trial, Attorney Scott Edgar ("Edgar") joined as 
counsel for Code and worked with Fuller and Childs throughout the trial. Defendant Cathy 
Code's Combined Motion and Memorandum in support of Motion for Attorney Fees at Exhibit 8 
(January 2, 2013). 
On August 3, 2012, the parties met for a pretrial conference. For reasons the court cannot 
recall at this time, the claims against Still Standing Stables were released. Order Dismissing 
Defendant Still Standing Stable, L.C. with Prejudice (October 3, 2012). Accordingly, at the time 
of trial, only ReMax's claims against Chuck Schvenaveldt and Cathy Code survived. The jury 
trial was held on August 6, 7, 8, and 10. At the close of Plaintiffs case, Code moved for a 
directed verdict, which the court later granted. Order Dismissing Cathy Code With Prejudice 
( August 24, 2012). The jury found Schvaneveldt liable for ReMax' s commission, but in 
response to the special verdict form's request for a determination of damages entered judgment 
in an amount incongruous with the contract. 
After the trial both ReMax and Schvaneveldt moved for a new trial. On February 28, 
2013, the court denied Schvaneveldt's Motion for New Trial. Ruling Denying Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial (February 28, 2013). That ruling was reaffirmed on May 16, 2013. Ruling 
and Order on Chuck Schvaneveldt's Motion fro New Trial and Motion to Strike (May 16, 2013). 
On December 21, 2012, instead of granting a new trial to Plaintiff on the issue of damages, the 
court found that the jury's damage award was inconsistent with the jury's answers to the 
interrogatories contained on the special verdict form. Accordingly, the court "enter[ed] 
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judgment in accordance with the jury's answers to the interrogatories notwithstanding the jury's 
inconsistent damages award." Order and Judgment on Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial 
(December 21, 2012). 
On November 30, 2012, ReMax filed the instant Motion for a Detennination of Attorney 
Fees, and on January 3, 2013, Code filed her Motion for Attorney Fees. ReMax, Code, and Still 
Standing Stables have also asserted that they are entitled to an award of costs. 
Code's Motion for Attorney Fees 
Having prevailed in her defense of Plaintiffs' claims against her, Code now claims that, 
pursuant to the For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement's attorney fees provision, she is 
entitled to an award of $83,375 in attorney fees from "plaintiffs, Tim Shea, Hilary 'Skip' Wing, 
dba ReMax Elite, Elite Legacy Corp., dba ReMax Elite and Aspenwood Real Estate Corp., dba 
ReMax Elite .... " During the course of this litigation, Code was represented by four different 
attorneys: Sykes, Kimball, Childs, and Edgar. Fuller filed some motions on Code's behalf, but is 
not claiming that he ever represented her. Code has submitted affidavits by each attorney 
detailing their fees charged for their services. 
At the outset, the court notes that despite some confusion by all of the parties to this 
proceeding, Shea never filed any complaints against Code that became an official part of the 
record. Shea's claims contained in his September 10, 2009 Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim against Cathy Code were stricken. This court confirmed the nullity of these 
alleged claims both when it granted Shea's Second Motion to Amend and when SSS moved to 
strike their inclusion in Shea's Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Because Shea never 
filed any claims against Code, Code cannot recover any attorney fees from him. 
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With respect to the other plaintiffs, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any ... written contract ... when the provisions of the ... 
written contract ... allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. 
Here, ReMax filed a claim against Code seeking a commission based on the For Sale By 
Owner Commission Agreement, which contained a provision providing for an award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party for any action brought to enforce the agreement. Accordingly, Code, 
as the prevailing party, is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney fees. Hooban v. 
Unicity Intl., Inc., 285 P.3d 766 (Utah 2012). To the extent that Code's counterclaims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and other torts were dismissed, the court does not see 
that any of the fees requested by Code pertain to those claims. 
Having determined that Code is a prevailing party entitled to a reasonable and necessary 
attorney fee, the court must analyze the affidavits and testimony provided by Code's attorneys to 
determine if their fees are reasonable and necessary. Some principles that the court will follow 
include: (1) A client has the right to discharge and hire as many lawyers she deems necessary at 
her own discretion. An opposing third party, however, cannot reasonably be expected to pay for 
a new attorney to rehash old ground every time a new attorney is hired. (2) During the course of 
litigation, attorneys spend time discussing administrative details of the case, such as in a firm 
meeting. Some of this discussion is properly billable. However, to the extent that attorneys 
repeatedly engage in meetings which discuss attorney client relationships or other administrative 
matters, an opposing third party should not be required to pay for those fees. (3) The burden is on 
the party seeking attorney fees to show that the fees are reasonable and necessary. To the extent 
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that attorneys' affidavits and testimony fail to clarify what they are billing for, the court will not 
allow an award of those fees. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988), the Court listed four 
questions that should be answered when determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee. 
Those factors are: ( 1) what legal work was actually performed; (2) how much of the work 
perfonned was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter; (3) is the attorney's 
billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services; and 
( 4) are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors. Id. 
The court will review each of Code's Attorneys' requested fees in tum. 
A. Attorney Robert B. Sykes & Associates 
Attorney Robert Sykes has practiced law in Utah since 1974, and has appeared before 
this court on numerous occasions. At the time that he worked on Code's case, his billing rate 
was $350.00 per hour. Although the court feels this rate is a little high for the local legal 
community, it cannot find that the fee is unreasonable. 
Sykes' associate Alyson Carter is a young attorney with a few years experience in 
complex litigation. At the time she worked on Code's case, her billing rate was $225.00 per 
hour. The court finds that this rate is typical of attorneys with similar experience and training in 
this legal market and is reasonable. 
Sykes' associate Scott Edgar is a young attorney that from the court's own observations 
performed well in his representation of Code. At the time he worked on Code's case, as an 
associate for Sykes, his billing rate was $175.00 per hour. The court finds that this rate is typical 
of attorneys with similar experience and training in this legal market and is reasonable 
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On May 10, 2013, Sykes testified regarding his time expended representing Code. 
During the hearing, Sykes provided the court with a "Statement of Costs," dated May 13, 2013.6 
This document was received and considered during the evidentiary hearing on fees, and is hereby 
made a part of the record. 
With respect to page 1 of 3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs," the court makes the 
following findings: First, Sykes was the first attorney to represent Code. Accordingly, the court 
will allow recovery off ees for time spent reviewing the case in order to gain an understanding of 
its history. Second, the court will not allow recovery for time spent related to a motion to 
dismiss that was not ultimately filed. Indeed, the court finds that Sykes was confused regarding 
the purpose of the alleged motion to dismiss and could not clearly remember working on it. 
Third, the court will not allow recovery of fees for time discussing the case, without more detail 
provided. It is this court's judgment that such discussions are most likely administrative in 
nature; it is not reasonable to expect an opposing party to pay for them without greater detail 
concerning the purpose of the discussion. 
Following the principles outlined above, the court will allow an award of all of Sykes' 
fees listed on page 1 of 3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs" except the following: (1) "10/20/2009 
RB Sykes Discuss in firm meeting 0.10"; (2) "01/12/2010 RB Sykes Discuss in firm meeting 
0.10"; (3) "01/29/2010 Paralegal V AD-Drafting Mand MM to Dismiss as to Code 0.80"; (4) 
"02/17/2010 Read various documents, including potential motion to dismiss, docket from the 
court, etc. 050,,; (5) "02/23/2010 RB Sykes Review status in firm meeting 0.10"; and (6) 
"05/04/2010 RB Sykes Discuss in firm meeting 0 .10." 
6 Although Sykes' Statement of Costs is dated after the May 10, 2013 hearing, the court did receive it during the 
hearing and consider it. 
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With respect to page 2 of 3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs," the court makes the 
following findings: First, from June 9, 2010, to June 15, 2010, Sykes and Edgar worked on 
briefing a supplemental memorandum to SSS' s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of 
Commission Counterclaims, which Code had previously joined. The court permitted this 
briefing in its May 27, 2010 hearing when it granted Code's rule 56( f) motion. Given that this 
was Code's first attempt to have the case dismissed on the theory that ReMax lacked standing, 
the court finds that it was reasonable and necessary. Despite the fact that Code ultimately lost 
this motion, it helped to narrow the legal issues in dispute. Second, on July 2, 2010, Sykes billed 
five and a half hours to attend a deposition conducted by his associate Scott Edgar. Owing the 
May 10, 2013 hearing, Sykes testified that he participated to help train Edgar. The Court will not 
allow an award of fees for time spent training Sykes' associate. 
Following the principles outlined above, the court will allow an award of all of Sykes' 
fees listed on page 2 of 3 of Sykes' ''Statement of Costs" except the following: (1) "06/02/201 
RB Sykes Review bill. Make changes. Discuss in finn meeting 0.1 0"; (2) "06/16/2010 SR Edgar 
TC to Fuller re Quinney and legal strategies to possibly sue for bringing action w/out merit"; (2) 
"06/22/2010 RB Sykes Discuss case in finn meeting. 0.1 O"; (3) "06/24/2010 RB Sykes TC Bill 
Kimball re status. 0.20"; (4) "06/29/2010 SR Edgar discuss strategy in Litstat 0.10"; and (S), 
07/02/2010 RB Sykes Attend Scott Quinney deposition. Attend Tim-Shea deposition. Meet 
w/Counsel to discuss strategy." 
With respect to page 3 of 3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs," the court makes the 
following finding: on July 8, 2010, Sykes worked on dictating a "lengthy letter providing status 
of the case" because Code had terminated Sykes' representation ofher. It is certainly 
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appropriate as an act of professionalism for Sykes to help ease the transition between himself and 
new counsel. It is not, however, reasonable to expect an opposing party to pay the fees 
associated with Code's choice to change counsel; that financial burdem should remain with 
Code. Accordingly, because all of the fees listed on page 3 of 3 are related to this transition, the 
court will not allow Code to recover them. 
Having reviewed all of the billing in Sykes' "Statement of Costs," and accounting for the 
above deductions, the court orders that to the extent Code's Motion for Attorney Fees seeks 
compensation for the representation of Robert B. Sykes & Associates, Code may recover 
attorney fees in the amount of $21,135.50. 
Sykes' "Statement of Costs" also includes $251.87 in costs for copies, faxes, and travel. 
These costs are expenses that are "ever so necessary, but are nonetheless not properly taxable as 
costs.". Young v. State, 16 P.3d 549, 554 (Utah 2000). Accordingly, Code cannot recover these 
costs. 
B. Attorney William Kimball 
Attorney William Kimball is an experienced attorney who is in-house counsel for Stake 
Center Locating, Inc., which is a company in which Schvaneveldt, Code's husband, owns a fifty 
percent interest. Kimball testified that his billing rate was $200.00 per hour, but also provided a 
"cost-plus rate" of $156.73 per hour. The court finds that a client is not permitted to recover a 
billable rate is accordance with the legal market for representation by in-house counsel. 
Softsolutions, Inc., v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46. Accordingly, to the extent Code can 
recover her fees for Kimball's representation, that fee shall be calculated according to the cost-
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plus rate provided. Further, the Court finds that $156.73 per hour is a reasonable rate for in-
house counsel in the local legal market for an attorney of Kimball's experience. 
On December 10, 2010, Kimball filed an affidavit listing his hours worked in 
representing Code. That affidavit was submitted in support of Code's second motion for 
attorney fees, which this court never issued a ruling on. On May 10, 2013, Kimball submitted 
another affidavit setting forth his cost-plus rate and stating that there was an "Exhibit A" 
attached that reflects the time he spent working on Code's case. The court, however, has been 
unable to locate any exhibit attached to Kimball's May affidavit. Given that the May 10, 2013 
affidavit requests $14,536.70 in attorney fees, i.e., compensation for 92.75 hours oflegal work, 
and the December 10, 2010 affidavit also requests compensation for 92. 75 hours of legal work, 
the court finds that the infonnation listed in the December 10, 2010 affidavit is the same 
infonnation which Kimball intended to attach to his May 10, 2013 affidavit. This finding is 
supported by Kimball's references to the document during his May 10, 2013 testimony. 
Kimball's affidavit reflects that he spent 92.75 working for Code. This time was spent 
almost entirely on three motions: (l) Code's first Motion for Attorney Fees against Shea, (2) 
Code's opposition to a Motion to Strike a portion of his Reply in Support of Code's Motion for 
Attorney Fees, and (3) Code's second Motion for Attorney Fees against Shea. In short, Kimball 
did nothing but attempt to recover Code's fees for a claim that Shea filed against her. 
Shea never filed any claims against Code. Although the Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim served on Code technically asserted claims by Shea against Code, the court struck 
those claims from the beginning. As noted above, on January 19, 2010, this court denied Seller's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim stating: "The Court has 
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already ruled that [Shea's claim for a commission is] futile, and they have been stricken. No 
further action by the Court is necessary." (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the court erred in 
accepting Code and Shea's representations that Shea had filed a claim against Code when it 
issued its November 1, 2010 "Interim Ruling on Defendant Cathy Code's [First] Motion for 
Attorney Fees." Indeed, Code should have known that the court had previously stricken Shea's 
complaints against her a mere two months after she filed her answer, and, arguably, should have 
known that they were stricken when the court denied Shea's attempts to have them added in the 
"Second Motion to Amend." 
Accordingly, Kimball's motions for attorney fees against Shea were completely without 
merit and unnecessary. For this reason, to the extent that Code's Motion for Attorney Fees seeks 
compensation for fees incurred during Kimball's representation, Code's Motion is denied. 
C. Attorney Kenneth Craig 
Attorney Kenneth Craig, like Kimball, is in-house counsel for Stake Center Locating, Inc. 
Accordingly, to the extent Code may recover any fees for his service, it shall be calculated at 
Craig's cost-plus rate of $172.06. The Court finds that $172.06 per hour is a reasonable rate for 
in-house counsel in the local legal market for an attorney of Craig's experience. 
Craig's affidavit sets forth I 04.75 hours working on this case. Craig attributes 63.5 hours 
of that time to working on Code's behalf. From September 2011 to May 2012, Craig's affidavit 
reflects nothing more than work reviewing the case to familiarize himself with it. As noted 
previously, the court does not believe it is reasonable for an opposing party to pay attorney fees 
incurred for a new attorney to learn about the case when the party voluntarily replaces an 
attorney. 
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· In July 2012, Craig spent time doing some research and also helped prepare for trial. In 
early August 2012, Craig assisted in preparation for trial and attended the trial. During trial, 
Craig sat in the back of the courtroom and did not assist Fuller or Edgar, who presented the 
Defendants' case, in any manner. 
As noted above, Code is entitled to hire as many attorneys as she deems necessary. It 
appears, however, that with respect to Craig, she has done nothing more than hire a person to 
help Fuller, who was not Code's attorney. Further, although Craig's affidavit claims to separate 
out the time Craig spent on behalf of Code from the time he spent on behalf of other defendants. 
The court finds that there was no meaningful distinction. Indeed, Craig is in-house counsel for a 
company partially owned by Schvaneveldt, the losing party in this case. 
Accordingly, the court finds that Code has not met her burden to show that the fees 
incurred by Code pursuant to Craig's representation were reasonable and necessary. To the 
extent that Code's Motion for Attorney Fees seeks compensation for fees incurred during 
Attorney Craig's representation, Code's Motion is denied. 
D. Attorney Scott Edgar 
At some point after Code discharged Sykes, Attorney Scott Edgar left Sykes' finn and 
began his own practice. About one week before trial, Code hired Edgar to help with trial 
preparation and other matters. At the time of Edgar's representation, Edgar's hourly fee was 
$180.00 per hour. This fee is a mere $5.00 hirer than Edgar's fee when he was Sykes' associate. 
The court finds that it is reasonable. 
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Edgar's affidavit reflects that from July 23, 2012, to July 27, 2012, Edgar spent 14.2 
hours familiarizing himself with the case and discussing strategy with Fuller. Code may not 
recover for Edgar's time familiarizing himself with the case, as previously explained. 
From July 27, 2012, to August 7, 2010, Edgar spent 99.8 hours preparing for and 
attending the trial, and helping prepare a motion for directed verdict which was granted. The 
Court finds that this time was reasonable and necessary to the ultimate resolution of the case in 
Code's favor with one exception. On August 2, 2012, Edgar spent fifteen hours preparing for 
final pretrial and discussing trial strategy with Fuller. The court finds that this amoW1t of time is 
unreasonable because Code's interest in the action are different than those of the other 
defendants and it should not have been necessary for Edgar to participate in trial preparation to 
the extent that he did. Accordingly, the 99.8 hours shall be reduced by seven hours. 
Edgar is Code's current counsel arguing this motion for attorney fees. Edgar's affidavit, 
submitted prior to the May 10, 2013 hearing, reflects that he has spent 35.5 hours researching 
and preparing the instant motion. The court finds that this time is reasonable and necessary. 
Having reviewed all of the billing in Edgar's affidavits, and accounting for the above 
deductions, the court orders that to the extent Code's Motion for Attorney Fees seeks 
compensation for Scott Edgar's representation, Code may recover attorney fees in the amount of 
$23,094.00. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Plaintiffs, i.e., Hilary 'Skip' Wing, dba ReMax Elite; Elite Legacy Corp., dba ReMax 
Elite; and Aspenwood Real Estate Corp., dba ReMax Elite ( collectively "ReMax") have also 
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filed a motion seeking an award of attorney fees against Schvaneveldt based on the attorney fees 
provision of the For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement. 
ReMax first brought its claim against Schvaneveldt in its September 1 O, 2009 Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Prior to that time, however, ReMax had done significant 
work progressing its case for a commission. That work included filing its September 1 O, 2008 
Amended Complaint seeking the commission from Still Standing Stables and conducting 
extensive discovery, among other things. During the course of discovery, around April 2009, 
ReMax discovered evidence indicating that Schvaneveldt was personally liable for the 
commission. Accordingly, ReMax moved to amend its complaint and add Schvaneveldt as a 
defendant. Over the next few years Le Baron & Jensen represented Re Max in its efforts to obtain 
the commission. 
During the August 2012 jury trial, ReMax prevailed on its claim for the commission 
against Schvaneveldt. Further, prior to the trial, all of the defendants' claims against ReMax and 
Shea were dismissed. Accordingly, ReMax is the prevailing party with respect to Schvaneveldt 
and is entitled to a reasonable and necessary attorney fee for its efforts to collect from 
Schvaneveldt. ReMax is not the prevailing party with respect to Still Standing Stables or Code, 
and is not entitled to recover attorney fees for its efforts to collect from Code or Still Standing 
Stables. In the case of ReMax's claim, however, the court finds no reasonable distinction 
between the efforts expended to assert a claim against the various defendants; accordingly, the 
fee will not permit recovery of any work that was clearly directed at either SSS or Code 
individually. 
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During the course of litigation, there was some confusion about whether LeBaron & 
Jensen represented ReMax or just Tim Shea. This confusion was compounded by LeBaron & 
Jensen's consistent involvement with Shea, even though Shea was not a party to this litigation. 
LeBaron & Jensen's communication with Shea is understandable because Shea, pursuant to an 
Assignment of Claim agreement with ReMax, had authority concerning the direction and 
resolution of the case. Nonetheless, because Shea was not the party in interest, LeBaron & 
Jensen should not have filed motions on his behalf.7 
The court does not find any of the evidence presented by Schvaneveldf arguing that 
LeBaron & Jensen did not represent ReMax in its pursuit of the commission claim persuasive. 
Since ReMax filed its initial Motion to Amend in June 2008, all of the filings related to ReMax's 
efforts to obtain the commission were filed by LeBaron & Jensen. LeBaron & Jensen appeared 
as counsel for ReMax at multiple hearings and during the jury trial. Those snippets of evidence 
reflecting Skip Wing's mistaken understanding of the attorney client relationship are 
insignificant given the overwhelming amount of times that LeBaron & Jensen appeared on his 
behalf without his objection. Further, Attorney Duncan's statements in emails concerning the 
fact that he did not represent Skip Wing were a result of the confusing relationship, not an 
expression of the actual state of affairs. Lastly, the "Assignment of Claim" signed by Skip Wing 
clearly states: "ReMax will assign its claims to Tim Shea and authorize Tim's lawyer [LeBaron 
& Jensen] to act as co-counsel to ReMax's counsel on ReMax's behalf .... " This agreement 
7 To the extent that such motions were pertaining to Shea's defense of the counterclaims brought against him, it was 
entirely appropriate to include his name on the filings. However, it is the court's impression that such motions were 
filed by Attorney Wallace. 
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established an attorney-client relationship that was never terminated. Motion to Strike and 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Detennination and Award of Attorney Fees at Exhibit 2. 
Schvaneveldt has argued that ReMax should not be pennitted to obtain its attorney fees 
because LeBaron & Jensen had a conflict of interest representing both Shea & ReMax. The 
court agrees that there was a conflict of interest in representing both Shea and ReMax. 
Specifically, ReMax's interest in the commission was limited to $10,000, but Shea's interest was 
much greater. This created a natural conflict of interest. Any settlement offers around $10,000 
would have been reasonable for ReMax to accept, except out of consideration for Shea. Pursuant 
to rule 1. 7(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, however, this conflict was waiveable. 
ReMax arguably waived this conflict when it assigned its claim to Shea. The "Assignment of 
Claim" agreement states: 
... Tim Shea may in his own name and for his own benefit prosecute, collect, 
settle, compromise and grant releases on said claim as he, in bis sole discretion, 
deems advisable. However, the parties agree that it will be best if Tim prosecutes, 
collects, settles, compromises, and grants releases in ReMax' s name, but do so for 
Tim's benefit, except for the consideration amount mentioned above. 
Accordingly, the parties agree that Tim's lawyer may represent Tim's interests 
and act as co-counsel for ReMax in pursuing ReMax's offensive claim against 
Still Standing Stable, LLC, but that any and all strategy decisions and settlement 
decisions made as to the offensive claim for commission will be made by Tim 
Shea and his lawyer(s), and that the parties will cooperate with each other in 
making strategy and settlement decisions generally. 
Motion to Strike and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Determination and Award of Attorney 
Fees at Exhibit 2. 
Given the presence of this language in the Assignment of Claim, and the lack of evidence 
concerning other discussions between ReMax and LeBaron & Jensen. The court cannot 
conclusively state that LeBaron & Jensen has violated the rule against conflicts of interest. 
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Schvaneveldt also asserts that LeBaron & Jensen violated rule l.5(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct by failing to obtain ReMax's approval in writing for their contingency fee 
arrangement. LeBaron & Jensen did not address this argument in their briefing and appeared to 
concede Schvaneveldf s point during oral argument. The Assignment of Claim, however, 
directly states the terms of LeBaron & Jensen's fee agreement with ReMax. It states: 
... after the consideration amount is paid to ReMax, ... Tim Shea and Tim's 
lawyer will thereafter receive the remainder of whatever is recovered, to be split 
in accordance with the agreement between Tim Shea and Tim's lawyer. 
This language is somewhat ambiguous. The court, however, finds that the mutual intent of 
Remax and LaBaron & Jensen was that ReMax was to pay for LeBaron & Jensen's services 
pursuant to a preexisting fee agreement between Shea and LeBaron & Jensen. Schvaneveldt has 
not presented any evidence that the contingency agreement between Shea and LeBaron & Jensen 
was not in writing. 8 Accordingly, this court cannot detennine that LeBaron & Jensen has 
violated rule 1.5. 
Even if the court did find a violation of the rules of professional conduct, the court does 
not believe imposing a sanction denying a client's motion for attorney fees is an appropriate 
sanction for a client's attorneys' violations of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, especially 
when that client has not raised the issue or objected. 
Schvaneveldt also argues, without citing any supporting authority, that ReMax is not 
entitled to fees incurred prior to December 17, 2010, when this court granted Still Standing 
Stables' Motion to Enforce a Mandatory Dispute Resolution Agreement. The court is not 
8 Shea's contingency fee agreement with LeBaron & Jensen is somewhat unique: Shea agreed to pay LeBaron & 
Jensen's normal hourly rate only if he prevailed on the commission claim. Though an unusual contingency 
agreement, it is a bargain the parties could make; it is, therefore, reasonable. 6 r-1e:::7 ) I ,J 
1fi., 
11;,, 
RULING AND ORDER ON CHUCK SCHVANEVELDT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
Case No. 060906802 
Page 27 of 40 
persuaded. ReMax is entitled to those fees which are reasonable and necessary. Despite the fact 
that ReMax's initial claims were dismissed in favor of enforcing the dispute resolution 
agreement, the dismissal was without prejudice, and the effort expended on this case prior to that 
time was equally reasonable and necessary to pursuing its case. Additionally, that work 
perfonned prior to the Second Amended Answer, which added Schvaneveldt as a defendant, was 
also reasonable an necessary. Indeed, it was during discovery conducted prior to the time 
Schvaneveldt was added as a defendant that ReMax learned that Schvaneveldt was personally 
liable for the commission. 
Lastly, Schvaneveldt argues that ReMax is not entitled to attorney fees against him 
because "There is no mention of Chuck Schvaneveldt ... in the Assignment." Motion to Strike 
and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Detennination and Award of Attorney Fees at 13. 
Schvaneveldt points to a completely irrelevant document. ReMax asserts that it is entitled to 
attorney fees under the For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement. 
Accordingly, the court detennines that ReMax is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
ReMax's fees are to be calculated in accordance with Shea's agreement with LeBaron & Jensen, 
i.e., because Plaintiffs prevailed, ReMax must pay LeBaron & Jensen their hourly rate. The 
court will analyze LeBaron & Jensen's affidavit of fees utilizing the same principles as outlined 
in its discussion regarding Code's motion for fees. 
Attorney LeBaron's affidavit reflects that five attorneys from his firm worked on 
ReMax's case: Brian Duncan, Tyler Jensen, Mary Decker, Elicia Hansen, and himself. 
LeBaron's, Duncan's, and Jensen's hourly rate was $200.00 per hour. At the beginning of this 
case, each had practiced law for about eight years. The court finds that $200.00 per hour is a 
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reasonable fee for their services. Decker and Hansen each had one year experience at the time 
that they ~elped with the case. Their hourly rate was $150.00 per hour. The court finds that 
$150.00 per hour is a reasonable rate for their services. 
With respect to the charges listed in LeBaron's affidavit, the court makes the following 
findings: (1) LeBaron & Jensen did not represent Tim Shea as a party in this case. This should 
have been readily apparent to LeBaron & Jensen from the moment this court granted their first 
motion to amend in 2008, but specifically stated that Shea did not have a claim. (2) This case 
has been extremely complex. Nonetheless, some of this case's burden could have been avoided 
ifLeBaron & Jensen had heeded this court's directive that Tim Shea could not assert a claim and 
refrained from repeatedly asserting that motions were being filed both on his behalf and on 
behalf of ReMax. The court believes Re Max is responsible for its own fees that were generated 
due to this confusing act. (3) Likewise, LeBaron & Jensen spent a vast amount of time 
responding to motions brought by Fuller which lacked merit and did nothing more than repeat 
previously rejected arguments. The court believes Schvaneveldt is responsible for his attorneys' 
repeated attempts to assert matters the court had already rejected. 
Pursuant to the principles outlined above, both in the preceding paragraph and in the 
discussion of Code's motion for attorney fees, the court finds that all of LeBaron & Jensen's 
claimed attorney fees are reasonable and necessary with the following exceptions: 
1. Page 3, line 4, "05/22/2008 ... Draft Answer and Counterclaim against Still Standing 
Stables" shall be reduced from one hour to thirty minutes because ReMax lost the 
Counterclaim against Still Standing Stables. 
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2. Page 3, line 5, ''05/28/2008 ... Revise and draft Tim Shea Answer and Complaint" shall be 
excised because Tim Shea's "Complaint" was stricken. 
3. Page 5, line 11, "02/10/2009 ... research issue of attorney client privilege and review of 
Complaint." The court believes this research is likely related to LeBaron & Jensen's own 
professional obligations. It is unreasonable to expect Scvaneveldt to pay for it. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Page 5, line 13, "03/03/2009 ... Review e-mails and send e-mails out" shall be excised for 
lack of an explanation concerning the relationship to the case. 
Page 7, line 7, "06/26/2009 ... Read and respond to e-mails" shall be excised for lack of an 
explanation concerning the relationship to the case . 
Page 9, line S, "09/10/2009 ... Researched case law regarding partial motion for swnmary 
judgment as to the ready, willing and able buyer issue. Began drafting Memorandum in 
support of the Motion" shall be reduced from 8 hours to 4 hours. The court feels that this 
entry, in conjunction with previous billable entries, reflects an excess of time researching a 
single issue. 
7. Page 11, line 14, "04/07/2010 ... Prepare Motion in Opposition for Motion for more time" 
shall be excised. The court feels that this is an iconic example of the attoq-1eys' failure to 
communicate with each other, and give reasonable extensions of time when requested. The 
court will not reward inflexibility regarding deadlines to be rewarded with a grant of 
attorney fees. See Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility, Rules 10 and 14. 
8. Page 13, line 3, "07/27/2010 ... Attend failed deposition for ReMax." Without more 
information concerning why this deposition failed, the court is not willing to require 
Schvaneveldt to pay for it. 
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9. Page 13, line 8, "09/02/2010 ... Memorandum in Opposition to Code's Motion for 
Swnmary Judgment on Attorney Fees. Filed on 09/07/2010." This work was caused by 
LeBaron & Jensen's own failure to clearly identify their attorney client relationship and 
continued filings naming Shea as the party in interest despite that his claims had been 
stricken. Accordingly, neither party shall be compensated for work associated with Code's 
first two motions for attorney fees. 
10. Page 13, line 10, "09/16/2010 ... Review and initial research of Replay on Code's 
Summary Judgment Motion." This work pertained to Code's first motion for attorney fees. 
11. Page 13, line 10, "09/20/2010 ... Motion and Memorandum to Strike Reply Memorandwn. 
Filed on 09/22/2010." This work pertained to Code's first motion for attorney fees, and was 
without merit. 
12. Page 13, line 11, "10/06/2010 ... Reply Brief on Motion to Strike. Filed on 10/12/2010." 
This work pertained to Code's first motion for attorney fees, and was without merit. 
13. Page 14, line 1, "10/07/2010 ... Phone call with clerk about Motion to Strike." This work 
pertained to Code's first motion for attorney fees, and was without merit. 
14. Page 16, line I, "12/10/2010 ... Meeting with Miles and review of Cathy Code's Summary 
Judgment Motion. Filed 12/13/2010." This work pertains to Code's second motion for 
attorney fees, which was caused by ReMax's inclusion of Shea's stricken claims in the 
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 
15. Page 16, line 2, "12/13/2010 ... Read and respond to Mediation e-mail; review of Swnrnary 
Judgment Motion; work on Response to Motion for Summary Judgment." This shall be 
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reduced from 5. 7 hours to .3 hours. The work related to the motion for summary judgment 
is related to Code's second motion for attorney fees. 
16. Page 16, line 3, "12/13/2010 ... Finish draft of Memorandum in Opposition to 2nd Code 
Attorney Swnmary Judgment; Discuss new SSS Motion fro Summary Judgment; make 
revisions to Code Motion and review Still Standing Stables' Motion.'' This shall be reduced 
from 4.4 hours to 2.2 hours because some of the work is related to Code's second motion for 
attorney fees. 
17. Page 16, line 9, "12/30/2010 ... Study docket and file and do research on issues of the 
dismissal; check docket and prepare various objections and responses to current pleadings 
such as submission and objections; put together game plan and list of pleadings to prepare." 
This shall be reduced from 4.9 hours to 4 hours. The court believes that some of this work 
was in anticipation of filing a rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's order enforcing 
mandatory mediation. This order was sound, and any challenges thereto were without merit. 
The court will not require Schvaneveldt to pay for ReMax's refusal to accept this court's 
judgment. 
18. Page 16, line 10, "12/31/2010 ... Research on issues of fraud on court and 60(b)(3) issues." 
Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with Re Max's rule 60(b) 
motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
19. Page 16, line 11, "01/03/2011 ... Revise and file objections and reply to objection (fild on 
01/03.2011); prepare Reply Memo as to Code on Motion to Amend; prepare Memorandum 
in Opposition to time to Extend Answer to our Motion for Summary Judgment or to Strike; 
Work on 60(b) Motion. Files on 01/10/201 l." This work shall be reduced from 5.9 to 3.9 
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hours. Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax' s rule 
60(b) motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
20. Page 17, line 2, "01/10/2011 ... Finish 60{b) Motion and Prepare MOP to Motion to Strike 
3rd Motion to Amend .... " This work shall be reduced from 3.4 hours to 2.4 hours. Like 
those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax' s rule 60(b) motion 
challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
21. Page 17, line 4, "0 l /13/2011 ... Review of Cathy Code's Reply Memo ... on Motion for 
Summary Judgment." This work is related to Code's second motion for attorney fees. 
22. Page 1 7, line 6, "02/01/2011 ... Read and Draft Opposition to Motion to Extend 60(b) 
Answer." Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's 
rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
_ 23. Page 17, line 7, "02/02/2011 ... Prepare exhibits for Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
to Extend Answer to 60(b)." Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work 
deals with ReMax's rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory 
mediation .. 
24. Page 18, line 3, "03/22/2011 ... Review latest pleading; work on Reply to 60(b) Motion .. 
. " Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's rule 60(b) 
motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
25. Page 18, line 4, "03/22/2011 ... Work on reply to 60(b) .... " Like those fees described in 
paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's 
order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
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26. Page 18, line 9, "03/25/2011 ... Contunied work on Reply Memorandum for 60(b) Motion." 
Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's rule 60(b) 
motion challenging the court's order t_o enforce mandatory mediation. 
27. Page 18, line 10, "03/28/2011 ... Prepare for Filing and hand deliver 60(b) Reply 
Memorandum to Court." Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals 
with ReMax's rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory 
mediation. 
28. Page 18, line 14, "06/06/2011 ... Review of various documents regarding bankruptcy of 
Tim Shea; review of Bankruptcy code and Utah law regarding interest in contingency fee 
case, draft objection to Motion to Settle." Work related to Tim Shea's Bankruptcy is 
unnecessary because Tim Shea was not LeBaron & Jensen's client in this case. While this 
work may be important with respect to Shea's status as a client outside of this litigation, 
LeBaron & Jensen have not shown how this work was necessary to pursuing ReMax's claim 
for a commission. 
29. Page 18, line 15, "06/06/2011 ... Work with Tyler Jensen to get Objection to Settlement put 
together and filed." This work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
30. Page 19, line 1, "06/20/2011 ... Meeting with Mike Bingham to go over additional research 
for objection to Motion to settle as filed by David Miller." This work deals with Shea's 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
31. Page 19, line 2, "06121/2011 ... Telephone call with David Miller." This work deals with 
Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
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32. Page 19, line 3, "06/22/2011 ... Conducted extensive research and talked with Miles about 
research findings .... ,, This work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
33. Page 19, line 4, ''06/23/2011 ... Prepare for, travel to and from, and appear at hearing in 
Bankruptcy Court .... " This work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
34. Page 19, line 5, "06/24/2011 ... Discussion with Miles LeBaron regarding how to proceed 
with the Bankruptcy matter .... " This work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
35. Page 19, line 6, "06/24/2011 ... Strategy discussion with Tyler Jensen on when to approach 
David Miller again about abandoning the claim .... " This work deals with Shea's 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
36. Page 19, line 8, "08/18/2011 ... Phone call to heath Isaacs to talk about how the hearing on 
the objection to Tim Shea's exemption status on the real-estate commissions .... " This 
work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
3 7. Page 20, line 2, "10/12/2011 . . . Phone call from Tim Shea to discuss case status and 
strategy; Draft email to Heath Isaacs, Bankruptcy counsel .... " This work deals with Shea's 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
38. Page 33, line 8, "11/27/2012 ... Review previous associate's work on attorney fees issue ... 
. " The court will not allow recovery of fees for duplicate work due to change of attorneys. 
39. Page 35, line 7, "01/04/2013 ... Review of Code Motion for Attorney fees." This deals 
with the claim that ReMax lost. 
40. Page 35, line 9, ''0 1/04/2013 ... Draft Memorandum ... ; Began review of Cathy Code's 
Motion for Attorney Fees." This work shall be reduced from 6.5 hours to 4 hours because 
some of the work deals with the claim that ReMax lost. 
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41. Page 36, line 2, "01/15/2013 ... Discussion with Elicia Hansen regarding opposing 
counsel's Motion for Attorney Fees .... " This deals with the claim that ReM.ax lost. 
42. Page 36, line 3, "01/16/2013 ... Review Motion for Attorney fees (Code's); Discuss case 
with Miles; review case law; review Affidavits; Review Miles' Reply Memorandum on 
Motion to Quash." This work shall be reduced from 4.1 hours to 2 hours because some of 
the work deals with the claim that ReMax lost. 
43. Page 36, line 4, "01/16/2013 ... Work on Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash 
Supplemental Order; Continued work with Brian Duncan on Memorandum in Opposition to 
Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees." This work shall be reduced from 2.4 hours to 1.2 
hours because some of the work deals with the claim that ReMax lost. 
44. Page 36, line 5, "01/21/2013 ... Continued research and drafting on issue of attorney fees 
categorizing and reasonableness." This work shall be reduced from 2.8 hours to 1.4 hours 
. because this description does not specify whether this work was done to support ReMax 's 
motion for fees or to defend Code's motion for fees. 
45. Page 36, line 6, "01/22/2013 ... Work on finishing draft of issue of reasonable and 
categorized attorneys fees." This work shall be reduced from 1.8 hours to .9 hours because 
this description does not specify whether this work was done to support ReMa.x's motion for 
fees or to defend Code's motion for fees. 
46. Page 36, line 7, "01/22/2013 ... Work on research and drafting Memorandum in Opposition 
to Charles Schvaneveldt's Motion for New Trial; Meet wit [sic] Syracuse City Attorney on 
issues of alleged criminal conduct." This work shall be reduced from 4. 7 hours t9 2.5 hours 
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because this description does not indicate how the meeting regarding criminal conduct 
related to prosecution ofReMax's claim for a commission against Schvaneveldt. 
47. Page 37, line 7, "02/01/2013 ... Work on Memorandum in Opposition to Cathy Code's 
Motion for Attorney's Fees .... " This work deals with a claim that ReMax lost. 
48. Page 37, line 8, "02/06/2013 ... Discussion with Miles about Attorneys fees Motion (Cathy 
Code's)." This work deals with a claim that ReMax lost. 
Having reviewed all of the billing in LeBaron's affidavit, which amounted $160,978.50, 
and accounting for the above deductions, which amount to $13, 607.50, the court orders that 
ReMax may recover attorney fees in the amount of $147,371.00. 
Further the court finds that all ofLeBaron & Jensen's claimed costs are reasonable and 
necessary with the following exceptions: (1) Page 13, line 7, "09/01/201 Copies"; and (2) ''Page 
27, line 7, "08/02/2012 ... Airfare for Hilary 'Skip' Wing to fly here for the Trial." Copies are 
not "fees that are required to be paid to the court and witnesses" and are not recoverable. 
Further, the costs of a client attending the trial is not a taxable cost. ReMax requested $2,887.26 
in costs, these deductions total $579.00. Accordingly, ReMax may recover $2,308.26 in costs. 
Still Standing Stables' and Code's Memorandum of Costs 
On January 9, 2013, SSS and Code, both prevailing parties in this case, filed a 
Memorandwn of Costs pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Plaintiffs failed to file the required 
"motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court," advising the court of their objection to any 
costs included in SSS's and Code's Memorandum. The court is tempted to award the requested 
costs based solely on Plaintiffs' failure to object. However, given this court's responsibility to 
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do justice and only award those costs permitted under rule 54( d), the court detennines that it will 
evaluate the Memorandum of Costs on the merits. 
Rule 54(d)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "costs shall be allowed as 
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Accordingly, the costs 
claimed must be incurred by a prevailing party to the action. Here, Plaintiffs brought claims 
against three defendants: Still Standing Stables, L.C.; Cathy Code; and Chuck Schvaneveldt. 
The claims against Still Standing Stables and Code were dismissed, but Plaintiffs prevailed on 
their claims against Schvaneveldt. Based on the fact that two of the three defendants prevailed, 
and their costs were shared during the course of litigation, SSS and Code assert that they are 
entitled to two-thirds of the costs incurred. SSS and Code, however, do not point to any law 
which allows for such a blunt division of the costs incurred, or explain how the division of costs 
were billed to the individual defendants. This blunt division is especially troubling because SSS 
was named as a defendant in ReMax's September 10, 2008 Amended Complaint, but 
Schvaneveldt and Code were not added as defendants until the September 10, 2009 Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Clearly the costs were not equally divided between the 
defendants. 
The only meaningful distinction that the court can conclude is to permit SSS to recover 
its taxable costs which were incurred during that period when SSS was the only named 
defendant. Once Schvaneveldt and Code were added as defendants and began sharing their costs 
with SSS, it becomes impossible to distinguish the costs incurred on behalf of Schvaneveldt, a 
losing party, from the costs incurred by SSS or Code in any meaningful way, at least based on 
the cursory information provided by SSS and Code. 
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According to the Memorandum of Costs, SSS incurred the following costs before 
Schvaneveldt and Code were added as defendants: (1) the costs associated with the depositions 
of Chuck Schvaneveldt, Tim Shea, John Doxey, Nina Cleere, and Cathy Code, totaling 
$2,659.73; and (2) $35.00 to subpoena Metro National Title. 
The court may only award the prevailing party its costs of depositions if 
it ~nds that the depositions are taken in good faith, and are essential to the party's 
development and presentation of its case, either because the depositions were used 
in a meaningful way at trial, or because the development of the case was of such a 
complex nature that the information provided in the deposition could not have 
been obtained through less expensive means of discovery. 
Young v. State, 2000 UT 91 at 1 23. Here, as illustrated above, this case has a long and complex 
history, and the court believes SSS conducted the five depositions in good faith. Accordingly, in 
light of Plaintiffs' failure to specifically object to any of the depositions in writing, as required 
by rule 54(d)(2), the court assumes that SSS's depositions were reasonable and necessary to 
obtain the information provided, and SSS is entitled to recover those costs. 
Regarding the $35.00 subpoena fee related to Metro National Title, "costs" as defined in 
rule 54( d) are "fees that are required to be paid to the court and witnesses." Id see also Beaver 
v. Quest, Inc., 31 P .3d 114 7 (Utah 2001) ( excluding a contour model, photographs, and certified 
copies as not taxable costs of court). While the cost of serving a subpoena may be necessary to 
advance discovery, it is not "fees that are required to be paid to the court and witnesses." 
Accordingly, SSS cannot recover the $35.00 costs associated with its subpoena served on Metro 
National Title. 
Accordingly, SSS is entitled to recover $2,659.73 for those costs associated with the 
depositions taken prior to the time Schvaneveldt and Code were added as defendants. SSS and 
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Code have failed to provide any meaningful way to distinguish their costs from Schvaneveldt's 
costs after Schvaneveldt was added as a defendant. Therefore, SSS and Code are not entitled to 
any of their costs incurred after Schvaneveldt was added as a defendant. 
Accordingly, the court orders as follows: 
I. Code's Motion for Attorney Fees is granted in part and denied in part. Code may recover 
$21,135.50 for the representation of Robert B. Sykes & Associates and $23,094.00 for 
the representation of Scott Edgar. In all other respects Code's Motion for Attorney Fees 
is denied. 
2. ReMax's Motion for Determination and Award of Attorney Fees is granted in part and 
denied in part. ReMax may recover $147,371.00 in attorney fees and $2,308.26 in costs. 
3. Still Standing Stables and Code's Memorandum of Costs is granted in part and denied in 
part. Still Standing Stables is entitled to recover $2,659.73 for those costs associated 
with the depositions taken prior to the time Schvaneveldt and Code were added as 
defendants. In all other respects the motion for costs is denied. 
This is the Court's final order on attorney fees and costs; no further order pursuant to Rule 
7(f) is required. 
DA TED this 4:z day of ) tt_i/J; 2013 
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FULLER LAW OFFICE, LC 
1090 North 5900 East 
Eden, Utah 84 310 
Attorney for Defendants Still Standing Stables & Chuck Schvanveldt 
Brian P. Duncan 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
476 West Heritage Park Blvd. #200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Attorney for Plaintiff ReMax 
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EDGAR LAW, P.L.L.C. 
379 North 1075 West, Ste. 226 
Farmington, UT 84025 
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Exhibit B For Sale By Owner Contract (also attached as Exhibit 4 of 
Appellant's Addendum, Reproduced Here for the Court's 
Convenience) 
. ..J 
To: +1-8019743030 Page 6 cf 9 
JAN-20-2006 FRI tt:50 AM 
• 
1 2006-01-20 20:39:50 (GMT) 
FAX NO • 
• 
'00166S1819 From: csthv code 
' 1./S/2,; oi Jo~: 47 ·Ae393 
lli FOR SALE BY OWNER·COMMISSION AGREEMENT & ,t.GE_ N. c __ v_ DISCLOSURE ~ This Is a i.11y ~llding contnd- If ,OU dasit-e &opt or ta.a IIIMos, conM rourdomO!t crm ~- ""ou.,.,n 
1. THIS COMMISSION AGREEMENT Is entered into on this 2.0IIL..: day cf January, 2Q06 • between Re/Mu EIUB { LaytoQ Branch ) (the "Company-). induding Drn SbQI (tt'ae ·Agetlf') as the authorized agent for the Company, and 
Chuck and Cill]y Code (tne •seller•, for real property owned by Seller des.:;ribed a& follows: Pagel# 
23-QO§;-OPQG Huntsville Vt ft431Q (the "'Prof)erV). 
2. BROKERAGE FEE. The Seller agrees to pay lhe COl1lpany, irteapective of agency re!ationshfp(s). as compensation 
.far serif~. a ~-F9- In 1ha.arnount¢S . . . . . or~ of'.~ acqw~~ m·~Pfopvrty, if the 
.3~er -~ an otrtr .. from. tJDD}ett Yfflm!D 1'M otA;mg,. (1tie ·auyaf.). or ~f.)4: 8ding on lhe ~ef's ~half, 
lo-P.Ur,chase:orexc:nang&:~ . ~°:~ aa~:~atJhe.Sroke• Fee shall be.due andp;qa_l>tt). .. from the 
proceec,a· o.f ltte Seller. ·on1he date of recoRfirlg of ~~enb) for the ~ or exchange of the Propar1y by the 
Buyero,ra~~ 011·ihe ~-~~ ,the,cate.·or:,exd;ange is prevented by default ortne Seirer. tt'IG Brokerage 
F• Qhall•~'be duo·8"(l payabfetoUit! <:ompany. 
3~ .. PR01£.C11dN f.11;:RfOD. ir'wlttdn §~lifter thi5 Comr11~on.:Agreetbem1$ 8"len!d into. tt\e Pmpefty is acquired 
~Y the swe,1 ,;,t ~ doo on the SUya(s bGtialf. :the .. $8Der agreesJo ~Y the·C9mpany·tie BrokGrage Fee stated in 
.Sedi~ 2/fhe Seller~ to ~Utie ~~ entering infr>ay.md·ticUng.agrcc,ncm.witfl another bu:,~clge. 
4~ SEt-1.J;H WAR~ISCUlSURf..V. The~ warmnt:.1hat the indivi®&ls or entfty Dsted above as the •Seller" 
represents an of u,e ,eco,d owners of the Property. The ·sener warrants thal it has marketabfe title artd an estahH~ti-:-r.t 
rf!Jhtto selkteasfJ, or~·~~~ Tmsenet $gree$ ·tr.a nea,Jts tt1e:n9CeSSafY ~ts Qt~-The 
eeite, agrees fo ftltfdstt bu~Wflh good;amt:madr.etat,ro line.- and to·payaf~ement.:·far a-~~c ~ge own•rs 
r;i_olicy of .title·insurimQe fear~ ·oo~ in 1he .amount of the·.1>Urci:hase JJ#ce~. The Seifer~• ra ftdly-m.rorm the Agent 
f~gar\1~'.the Sslle(~.k~ 'af·the ccndaicn of the Property •. TIPf ~er agmas to __ e,ersanaDy-.co~et;e and~ a 
~l_l~f.a.Propetty~n1Ji$dosurc ~- . . . . . .. . . . . .. 
5. 'J..GENCY.:JUi&ATIONSHCPS.. 8)'. ~nlngthi$ Comml6Ston AgreeffliQ1'd, ~ ~elll:?f:~~attd.~~ Qlat~,~ 
AtJ8••.• ~tt1he Prtl\Qpal/Yfard, Broker tor~ ~:(#t<,~-are.-rc&mmlffl1ft19:lhe Buyer. ~~e·Uuyec'.'s Agent. 
they ~II acft:en~~ ~ their fiduciary d~.lo .OM, ~r tif foyyJly,. l'u~ ~ra. CIJf.lfir{an6aUJy~ ·an.ct.teasonable 
car~ To• ~teracttnow18d~ toot the Company~ DleAgent nave ad'llsed lhe Seirer tt13l thB ~19r is enutted to bo 
repre,c;or1tccf py a ·rea.1 e~" ~Yant that wm:_,apriesel ~ the teller exdl.1$1\lf!ly. The Serlar_ hae. hc,wcver, elected not to btt 
repi~t.ledbfa tat estataagenttn ~ ~ lle. Sellar-•fur1tleradqi~and_ag,ees that aU ~ of the 
C.Q(nP-3"1 BM· the Agenl even thnM.ttm asatat °" &,Her in performing or wrttp1e~ ~ of tn:e SeRera:cuntractuat or 
legal oblig~tinfts. are '"tai-ided f0r1hc benefitof.UJeBuyaremu~ety~ l~1SCmnmfssi0nA~t(1oo n.~~-~~ 
Company 01 Che Agent to soJicil ufl'ens en U\& Property frotrJ the Lluyet •. lP'~·it a1rth0riz,e the Companto.r:theAQent to 
SOlidt offers ftum any othet'r,er&ort or entit\,. 
i.. ~Of£$S~.DNAL AOVl'Ct "ThA -~~ny_ and tho l\gc:nt are tra,ned in the mar1eeting of real estaee. Neither _thA 
¢orn~~Y,. r,-nr •~~tare triJ.Jncxt lo ~ide tho S~t ci( ~r,y PrOSJ)ediv•· buyer wkb 1e:gar or ta:>r RINIC1t1, or wf th 
t~oh:atadvtQo.ros~·the.~)'SlcaJ.mndfflan.Of 1he Property. fflhe ~ffer~-a~ge~rdlng:•(l)_pc1t·orpreiant 
co~tta~'Wnti.asn~ana.rxmdirgcod&.req~ts;.(ii).~J.or~~-~i)ttia.p~~eitiunt11iht:Pr.ope11y; 
(IV) this c~ Agreemen~ Qi (v) any~ for:the ~iaitidnof_~ ~y.tne Aal/tnt and the Co~p3f\Y 
STROfllOL.Y'.RECOM~ THATTHE·SEU.Ett()OTAfN,SUCHlNDaPENDEN.I AOVICE.·1F THE SEl.lJ:R fAJlSTO 
no SO, THE SELL.ER IS ACTING CONTRARY TO THE AIJVfCE OF°TJiE (X)~_PAMV~ . . 
1. DIGPUJe.RESOLUTION.,_The J;»arfiee awae that W1Y dtep11t~. an5=ln9 p_tiodo or after :a ct~s.Jng n,tulml to nus 
Cu,:t1mJ~i!tg~~ stt,·ff."ffr.t-~ &~ loJilediaticn through a rne:diation PJUYider m,uflJa_ffy~ upen by the 
paJ1jea;:f(~ p~ ~not fi!n.!if "PO" a~ provider. Use r:llspuit sr.:irl C'11:wbmitted to ffie. AmM~ ~\ion 
Ansod,~~on. ~Ch: J>-lriY·.aa,=s :eo be8f ·ibi· tl\lffl •tom at.~. It mediatkln, falls.· lt,Ut ~(p~ and romedies 
·avallablc J1n4.et1h.ba_ AgtfMll'ffli s1'1aD apply. · · 
~~- ·ATTORNEY-H:ES~ E:rcebt ~ C?Fov.ided in. Sactlon 7, In. any action ot proceeding artslng OUt of tn1a Commissfon 
Agr.ee~_entlnvoMng-the:Sallet'nrtd/orlhe. Ctimpm1Y. theprevaillng pa,ty td\aU be &ntitt8d to reasonable attorney~ and· costs. . ... 
9. SELL.ER AUTHC>RJZA TIONS. n,e "company IS authorized ta disdosa aft4:'I' dosing lhe final tcnns end salci5 pri~ ur 
the P~io«he rott~ MtJttfptR, ~ S<:,vice: ,fitls.1tdJ front Rc9(Qnal ML5 
10. ·-.ATTACHMENT. There l.J4RE kl ARE NOT:addiU<mat tem,s to.thfs.'.Commiaelon AgrMmf)nt If •ye&•1 sea 
t\dd~m.----lnC0fPOt&ltidi,ttD.1ftmComrnlssion ~.t,y_lh!s·~ . . · 
11 •. EQUAl..HOU~tNG Ol'PORTUNITY~.-Sel\erand the ComptflY 119reo to mmply·with F~t. stabt, cmd focal fair 
f\uut:d~g laws~ .· . . . . . . . . . 
12. FAXl:S". F~iJe (fax) tr-tnsmfsslon of a Signed copy af this Commuon Agreement. and tetransmisslar, of a signed 
fax, shah be~ .same as deffve.ry of an originef, If lhls transaction involve$ muitiple awner.1 tnis Commisskm Agreement 
may t;)e. tixcarted in C(lcJntel ~. 
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FAX NO. e 
13, ENTIRE AGREEMENT. Thia Co1'11mistion Ag1eement, lndudi"9 ti\• Sellafa Property Condltio,11 Dlsdosure farm, 
contain the entire agreement betweGn tne pa,ties felatlng to the Sllbjec:t cnatter of this Cornmlaslon Agreement. Tni, 
Commi$$lof1 Agntement may not be modified or amended exoep1 In Wliting Signed by the pa,tles hereto. 
THE UNDERSIGNED do hereby agree 10 lhe terms of 1111$ Commisston ~nt as of 1he date fit$\ above written. 
(SelletsSlgnature) 
Pace 2or2 UAAfORM8B 
.. 003~ 
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